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I. INTRODUCTION
It was the story of every investor’s nightmares. In late 2014, in-
vestment bank Morgan Stanley discovered a data breach—one that
potentially compromised private information from hundreds of
thousands of customer accounts—during a routine sweep.1 Although
Morgan Stanley had taken precautions against outside attackers, its
defenses had a major weak point: threats from within the company.
An employee of Morgan Stanley had exploited a security weakness in
Morgan Stanley’s employee server and taken the data in an attempt to
1. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325 (June 8, 2016).
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educate himself about market trends and investment strategies.2
Though the employee did not have any desire to release the customer
information, an outside attacker hacked into his home server and
stole the data.3
Stories such as the Morgan Stanley breach have captured the pub-
lic’s attention. Hundreds of news articles appear online every week
regarding data breaches and cybersecurity in general. Cybercrime has
led to millions of dollars in losses for businesses and individuals
around the world.4 In response, state and federal government entities
have gotten involved in the fight against data theft and lax security
practices.5
This Comment will focus on the SEC’s role in regulating key in-
vestment intermediaries: brokers,6 dealers,7 investment companies,8
and investment advisers.9 While the SEC has a number of statutes
2. See Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of Defendant Galen Marsh, No. 1:15-cr-
00641 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Sentencing Memorandum],
ECF No. 9.
3. Morgan Stanley, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325, at *2.
4. See PONEMON INST., 2016 COST OF CYBER CRIME & THE RISK OF BUSINESS INNOVA-
TION (2016), http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2016%20HPE%20CCC%20
GLOBAL%20REPORT%20FINAL%203.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/W7M3-
S9EL].
5. See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (uphold-
ing the FTC’s authority to impose sanctions against a company that suffered a
data breach); Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informa
tion-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/AL
67-2CPR] (providing a list of all state laws requiring businesses to notify custom-
ers about data breaches).
6. “Brokers” are those who, for their business, effect securities transactions for
others. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(4) (2012).
7. “Dealers” are those who engage in the business of buying and selling securities
for their own accounts. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(5), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (2012).
8. “Investment company” is a defined term in securities laws; mutual funds are the
most commonly recognized type of investment company. See generally Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2012).
9. “Investment adviser” is a defined term in securities laws; the general idea is that
an investment adviser is somebody who gives investment advice as part of a regu-
lar business (with certain exceptions). See generally Investment Advisers Act of
1940 § 2(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012). For brevity and readability’s
sake, this Comment will use the blanket term “investment intermediaries” when-
ever it refers to brokers, dealers, investment companies, and investment advisers
all at the same time. Regulation S-P—the primary focus of this Comment—ap-
plies to each of these regulated entities, and it will be easier to have one catchall
term for most of the discussion. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information
(Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. 40,333 (June 29, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 248).
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and regulations it can use to require data protection,10 its most obvi-
ously applicable regulation is Rule 30 of Regulation S-P, also known
as the “Safeguards Rule.”11 The Safeguards Rule requires investment
intermediaries to develop policies and procedures “reasonably de-
signed” to protect sensitive client data.12 Using this rule, the SEC has
brought a number of penalty actions against investment in-
termediaries over the past decade.13 It has also issued a number of
releases, providing additional guidance to regulated entities and in-
forming them of liability they might face in the event of a data
breach.14
For many reasons, the SEC’s approach to data security for invest-
ment intermediaries has been laudable. It has recognized the need to
protect sensitive client data while still granting investment in-
termediaries freedom to develop solutions based on their unique situa-
tions.15 The SEC’s enforcement approach, however, is inconsistent
and, in many cases, overly harsh. Fortunately, the SEC can use its
regulatory authority over investment intermediaries to create regula-
tions that promote responsible data security while still being fair to
regulated entities.16
10. See infra section IV.B.
11. 17 C.F.R. § 248.30 (2017). The SEC sometimes calls this rule the “Safeguard
Rule” (as opposed to the plural Safeguards). This Comment will use the name
Safeguards Rule because it is the more common term, as well as the term that
corresponds more closely with the text of the Act that gave the SEC authority to
promulgate the regulation. See Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-102 § 501, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012)). In any case,
when the SEC uses a description such as “Rule [number]” in its releases, the
number corresponds with the part of the C.F.R. section coming after the period.
For example, 17 C.F.R. § 248.10 is Rule 10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 is Rule 17a-3,
etc.
12. § 248.30(a).
13. See infra subsection IV.A.2.; see also infra Table 1 (outlining the various actions
the SEC has brought under the Safeguards Rule).
14. See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE NO. 2015-02, CYBER-
SECURITY GUIDANCE (2015) [hereinafter CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE], https://www
.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2015-02.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/JKD7-
2EQ2].
15. See § 248.30(a); CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14; see also NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY 2 (2017) (“Organizations will continue to have different risks—
different threats, different vulnerabilities, different risk tolerances—and how
they implement the practices [described in this framework] will vary.”); Vijay
Basani, “Checkbox Compliance” Won’t Stop Target-Like Breaches, USA TODAY
(Jan. 20, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2014/01/20/why-
checkbox-compliance-wont-stop-target-like-breaches/4655859 [https://
perma.unl.edu/2CLJ-P9TX] (describing how companies should be able to address
their own security needs without rigid guidelines because “[t]he ‘checkbox’
mentality places too much emphasis on Compliance over Risk Management”).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012) (requiring only that the SEC “establish appropri-
ate standards” regarding protection of customer information).
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This Comment begins by giving a background of the threats invest-
ment intermediaries face and the regulatory scheme they must navi-
gate. Part II examines some modern threats to sensitive customer
data. Part III offers a brief overview of the FTC’s role in data-security
regulation and a comparison of the FTC’s approach to the SEC’s. Part
IV describes current statutes and SEC regulations that a cyberattack
against an investment intermediary might implicate. Part IV also
gives an overview of each one of the SEC’s enforcement actions under
the Safeguards Rule.
Part V rejects the SEC’s current approach, focusing primarily on
the unfairness of assessing penalties against investment in-
termediaries that are, in most cases, victims themselves. Part VI of-
fers a three-part solution that will enable the SEC to continue its
important work regarding data security while also promoting the mar-
ket’s ability to develop creative solutions to modern threats. Finally,
Part VII examines problems that the SEC would create by adopting
other proposals for handling data security.
II. MODERN THREATS TO SENSITIVE DATA
Popular legend says that bank robber Willie Sutton, when asked
why he chose to rob banks, replied, “That’s where the money is.”17 In
many ways, modern investment intermediaries present the same type
of target to cybercriminals as banks do to robbers. Two things are true
about investment intermediaries: (1) they often have large amounts of
confidential client data and (2) their clients are people who have
money to invest, which makes their information valuable.18
While stories about cyberattacks and hackers capture the public’s
attention, the SEC’s regulations in this area of the law are not explic-
itly about cybersecurity. Rather, they are about customer data secur-
ity in general.19 Thus, an investment intermediary that leaves paper
files in an unsecure location would be just as liable under the Safe-
guards Rule as one that fails to take reasonable cybersecurity precau-
tions.20 However, modern technology has brought about “a previously
unimaginable explosion” in the connectivity of devices, including those
devices that companies use to store sensitive customer data.21 With
17. David Martin, The Ongoing Battle of Cybersecurity, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
(July 12, 2016), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/blogarticle/3569785/blog/
the-ongoing-battle-of-cybersecurity.html#/.WMYqh39Eoil.
18. See CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 1; Martin, supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., § 248.30.
20. See, e.g., J.P. Turner & Co., LLC, 98 SEC Docket 1729, 2010 WL 2000509 (ALJ
May 19, 2010).
21. David X. Martin, Building a More Effective Cybersecurity Defense, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/blogarticle/33817
26/blog/building-a-more-effective-cybersecurity-defense.html#/.WLN4qX9Eoil.
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that has come a corresponding explosion of cybercrime—to para-
phrase Willy Sutton, cyberspace is “where the [data] is.”22
Outside actors pose the most obvious source of data-security
threats for investment intermediaries. These actors have a number of
driving motivations. Some seek to steal sensitive customer data for
monetary gain, especially if the information they can take is valuable
and easy to use/sell (e.g., credit card information).23 Others—such as
terrorist organizations—might want primarily to cause widespread
damage and fear by announcing their attacks on key targets to under-
mine the public’s sense of security.24 Further, bad actors can use
cyberattacks to cause real-world damage, such as a terrorist organiza-
tion shutting down a power grid.25 Regardless of the motivation, in-
vestment intermediaries are clear targets for cyberattacks because of
the valuable information they hold and their importance to the na-
tional economy.26
Another threat investment intermediaries face—and one that can
be easy to overlook—is theft by employees themselves. In fact, em-
ployee theft of data led to the biggest settlement for the SEC in any
Safeguards Rule proceeding: one million dollars paid by Morgan Stan-
ley.27 Some employees might steal data for the same reasons as other
cybercriminals, such as the desire to sell the information for a profit.
Others might steal data for less obvious purposes, such as the em-
ployee in the Morgan Stanley breach who took data in an effort to
educate himself about market trends.28
22. Id.; see also PONEMON INST., supra note 4 (showing the rise in losses resulting
from cybercrime over the past few years); Lucy L. Thompson, Insecurity of the
Internet of Things,  SCITECH LAW., Spring 2016, at 32 (describing the security
risks posed by the amount of connectivity in modern devices).
23. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKT. ASS’N (SIFMA), SMALL FIRMS CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE
4 (2014); see also Experts Say It’s “Highly Likely” North Korea Was Behind the
WannaCry Ransomware Attack, FORTUNE (May 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/
2017/05/23/north-korea-wannacry-ransomware-symantec [https://perma.unl.edu/
S3Sa-BN66] (describing a worldwide attack involving ransomware—a particular
type of attack in which the attacker encrypts the victim’s data and only unen-
crypts it for a fee).
24. See Denise Johnson, Cyber Terrorism Is a Major Concern for U.S. Businesses,
CLAIMS J. (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2016/08/
15/272825.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/SND3-VCUV]; Mary Louise Kelly, ISIS
Uses Cyber Capabilities to Attack the U.S. Online, NPR (Apr. 25, 2016), http://
www.npr.org/2016/04/25/475631277/isis-uses-cyber-capabilities-to-attack-the-u-
s-online.
25. See Kelly, supra note 24.
26. See CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14.
27. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325, at *5 (June 8, 2016); see
also infra Table 1 (outlining the various actions the SEC has brought under the
Safeguards Rule).
28. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 2.
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Another easy-to-overlook threat is the one posed by third-party
vendors and service providers. Many companies outsource their back-
office processes, such as management of payment systems or other IT
services, to third-party vendors.29 Those vendors often have access to
their clients’ sensitive data. Thus, those vendors become a weak
point—cybercriminals can access a company’s data indirectly by
breaching the systems of vendors who provide services to the
company.30
In sum, investment intermediaries must navigate a virtual
minefield. Their data is a valuable target for many parties, their em-
ployees cannot be fully trusted, and all of their own security efforts
can become useless if an outside vendor with access to data suffers a
breach. Additionally, the threats these actors pose “are always evolv-
ing, increasing in sophistication in order to circumvent the most ro-
bust security devices.”31 In many ways, the issue becomes not whether
an investment intermediary will suffer a breach but rather when it
will suffer a breach.32
III. THE FTC’S APPROACH TO DATA SECURITY
Any discussion of regulatory approaches to data security must first
begin with describing the efforts of “the most prominent regulatory
agency” to address the issue: the FTC.33 While few scholarly works
address the SEC’s approach to data security, several authors recently
29. See Sarah Bloom Raskin, Deputy Sec’y, Treasury Dep’t, Remarks at the Texas
Bankers’ Association Executive Leadership Cybersecurity Conference (Dec. 3,
2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9711.aspx
[https://perma.unl.edu/YYE6-88GH].
30. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, OCIE’S 2015 CYBER-
SECURITY EXAMINATION INITIATIVE 2 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announce
ment/ocie-2015-cybersecurity-examination-initiative.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
UE89-9VXH]; Raskin, supra note 29; see also PONEMON INST., DATA RISK IN THE
THIRD-PARTY ECOSYSTEM (2016), http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/Data%
20Risk%20in%20the%20Third%20Party%20Ecosystem_BuckleySandler%20LLP
%20and%20Treliant%20Risk%20Advisors%20LLC%20Ponemon%20Research%
202016%20-%20FINAL2.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/22JK-ZGS4] (describing the
risks posed by companies’ relationships with third-party vendors who have access
to sensitive records).
31. Brian Contos, Thinking Outside the Product Box, CSO ONLINE (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.csoonline.com/article/3011877/security-awareness/thinking-outside-
the-product-box.html [https://perma.unl.edu/U98L-FSYC].
32. As FBI Director James Comey described the situation: “There are two kinds of
big companies in the United States. There are those who’ve been hacked . . . and
those who don’t know they’ve been hacked . . . .” Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data
Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955, 957 (2016).
33. Michael Hooker & Jason Pill, You’ve Been Hacked, and Now You’re Being Sued:
The Developing World of Cybersecurity Litigation, FLA. B.J., July–Aug. 2016, at
30, 38; see also Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 957 (describing the FTC as being “the
primary regulator of online privacy and data security in the United States”).
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have written about the FTC’s enforcement efforts.34 Those authors’
praises and criticisms of the FTC give insights into how the SEC
should treat data security issues moving forward.35
The FTC’s strategy has been primarily to use enforcement actions.
Rather than passing regulations regarding data security,36 it has
brought actions against companies with allegedly lax cybersecurity
practices in an attempt to build a body of administrative decisions and
settlements that other companies can use for guidance.37 In other
words, the FTC is attempting to build “the functional equivalent of
common law” in the area of privacy and data security.38
The rationale for the FTC’s approach lies in the language of its
statutory grant of authority and the practical realities of data-security
regulation.39 The FTC’s power to regulate data-security practices
comes from its consumer-protection mission in section 5 of the FTC
Act, which gives it the authority to penalize businesses who engage in
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”40 In brief, section 5 gives com-
panies two standards with which their conduct must comply: they
must not act deceptively or unfairly. Generally, companies engage in
“deceptive” acts or practices when they fail to live up to their express
promises (e.g., a company falsely claiming that it encrypts customer
data).41 For conduct to be “unfair” it must: (1) cause or be likely to
cause substantial injury, (2) not be outweighed by offsetting benefits,
and (3) not be reasonably avoidable by consumers.42
34. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC
Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015) [hereinafter Scope and Po-
tential]; Hurwitz, supra note 32.
35. See infra Part V.
36. In the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Congress gave the FTC authority to regulate
the data security practices of any “financial institution” not subject to the juris-
diction of any other agency. 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a)(7) (2012). The FTC used this
authority to promulgate its own version of the Safeguards Rule, found in 16
U.S.C. pt. 314 (2016). However, the primary controversy involving the FTC’s
data-security enforcement efforts surrounds its use of its section 5 authority,
which applies to all businesses, rather than merely financial institutions. See
generally Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 1003–05 (discussing FTC jurisdictional
concerns).
37. See Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 966–67. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow
Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583
(2014) [hereinafter Common Law of Privacy].
38. Common Law of Privacy, supra note 37, at 619.
39. See generally Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 1008; Common Law of Privacy, supra
note 37, at 656.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012 & Supp. 2014); Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 964.
41. Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 965, 968 n.58; Common Law of Privacy, supra note 37,
at 599; see, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015);
GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94 (1999).
42. § 45(n); Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 965.
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Section 5’s statutory grant of authority for the FTC to protect con-
sumer interests is vague, especially under the unfairness prong.43
What types of data breaches would constitute substantial injuries?
What makes a data-security practice likely to cause such an injury?
What types of offsetting benefits might weigh against additional ef-
forts toward data security? What steps might reasonable consumers
take to avoid substantial injuries resulting from data breaches? In
short, section 5 does not resemble anything close to a bright-line rule.
Thus, the FTC’s jurisprudence on data-security matters has been
analogous to the development of rules under the common law: it “be-
gan very generally” with relatively easy cases involving deception
before moving into cases that were more complex.44
In some ways, the constant, rapid evolution of technology and
cyber threats make a case-by-case approach to regulation necessary.45
Proponents of the FTC’s efforts describe its approach as one that pro-
vides “flexibility to adapt to new situations” in a way that static regu-
lations do not.46 Further, they argue that FTC enforcement actions,
when viewed collectively, give companies “a rather detailed list of in-
adequate security practices.”47 Therefore, businesses should be on no-
tice of the general types of practices that could lead to penalty actions.
However, some unpredictability remains: businesses can never be
completely certain whether the FTC will find their data-security ef-
forts unfair.48 In fact, a company cannot even be certain the FTC will
43. Common Law of Privacy, supra note 37, at 649. The deception prong of section 5
tends to be the more straightforward—and thus less controversial—of the two.
Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 1015. Either a company lied about its data-security
practices or it did not. Granted, certain fact-based questions remain: deceptions
must be material (similar standard to securities laws) and they must be likely
under the circumstances in which they are made to mislead reasonable consum-
ers. FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the relative
clarity of deception as opposed to unfairness, combined with the ability to bring
unfairness claims against any company regardless of its statements to consum-
ers, means that most of the FTC’s “data security jurisprudence has been devel-
oped under . . . [its] ‘unfairness’ authority.” Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 964.
44. Common Law of Privacy, supra note 37, at 649–50; see also Hurwitz, supra note
32, at 969 (“[The FTC’s] initial cases focused on deception, where companies
failed to live up to their stated security policies.”).
45. See Scope and Potential, supra note 34, at 2245, 2264–65; cf. Hurwitz, supra note
32, at 1008 (“[T]he basic rationale for allowing agencies to develop rules through
adjudication is that, in some instances, it is difficult to craft ex ante rules.”).
46. Scope and Potential, supra note 34, at 2265. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger
& Deirdre K. Mulligan, New Governance, Chief Privacy Officers, and the Corpo-
rate Management of Information Privacy in the United States: An Initial Inquiry,
33 LAW & POL’Y 477 (2011) (describing the policies underlying the FTC’s efforts in
consumer privacy and data security).
47. Common Law of Privacy, supra note 37, at 650–55 (providing a list of security
practices the authors pulled from various FTC decisions).
48. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 273–75 (2010).
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follow its previous decisions, given that they have no binding prece-
dential value.49 Still, some proponents argue that this built-in unpre-
dictability is a good thing because if a business cannot find bright-line
standards with which to comply, it will attempt instead to adopt the
strongest possible data-security standards in order to avoid FTC
enforcement.50
Critics of the FTC’s data-security enforcement, however, point out
numerous flaws in its approach. First, Congress has never explicitly
ordered the FTC to use its section 5 to regulate data-security prac-
tices—a key omission if the FTC wants the public to regard its actions
as legitimate.51 Rather, the FTC took its general authority to regulate
unfair acts and practices and stretched it into a new area. The result
is that “most consumers and businesses do not naturally think of [the
FTC] as a data security regulator—let alone as the nation’s primary
source of data security protections.”52 If businesses do not regard the
FTC as a data-security regulator, they will not be likely to seek its
guidance on such matters.53
Second, the FTC’s enforcement strategy raises fairness concerns.
To begin with, the FTC’s authority under section 5 can extend to every
single business in the United States.54 Unfortunately, while almost
all businesses maintain electronic records, very few are able to afford
the type of legal counsel necessary to navigate the FTC’s quasi-com-
mon law.55 To compound the problem, relatively few attorneys have
expertise in FTC data-security practices or understand the problem in
the first place—most businesses will focus on complying with state
49. Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 987.
50. Amicus Curiae Brief of Eight Privacy and Security Law Professors in Support of
Respondent at 9–12, LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, No. 16-16270 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2016),
2017 WL 664269 [hereinafter Security Law Professors Brief].
51. See Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 1005.
52. Id. at 1011. Some reason exists to believe this might change, especially if the FTC
continues bringing high-profile cases. In the aftermath of the Third Circuit’s
Wyndham decision, numerous articles discussed the FTC’s power to bring actions
against companies for alleged failures in data protection. See, e.g., Grant Gloss,
FTC Can Bring Down the Hammer on Companies with Sloppy Cybersecurity,
Court Rules, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.computerworld.com/
article/2975054/security/ftc-can-bring-down-the-hammer-on-companies-with-
sloppy-cybersecurity-court-rules.html [https://perma.unl.edu/X2D8-7ESA]; Andy
Greenberg, Court Says the FTC Can Slap Companies for Getting Hacked, WIRED
(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/court-says-ftc-can-slap-compa-
nies-getting-hacked [https://perma.unl.edu/VN9Z-2XJJ]. Nevertheless, an ex-
plicit grant of authority from Congress to police all businesses’ data-security
practices would confer legitimacy on the FTC’s efforts in a way that its current
approach lacks. Cf. infra subsection IV.A.1. (describing the SEC’s statutory man-
date under the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act).
53. Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 1012.
54. See id. at 1003–05.
55. Id. at 1003.
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laws or industry-specific regulators.56 Further, companies that violate
the FTC’s uncertain standards face considerable penalties. Although
the FTC’s ability to assess monetary fines is limited, the standard set-
tlement between the FTC and businesses is a twenty-year consent or-
der, during which time the business must agree to “ongoing
monitoring and security audits and the threat of substantial fines for
future breaches.”57
Third, the FTC’s methods raise doubts about the quality of any
rules it develops. Although the FTC has explicitly referred to its ef-
forts “as developing a ‘common law’ body of rules,”58 critics have
pointed out numerous differences that call the analogy into question.
Chief among these differences is that “[t]he FTC is not an independent
adjudicator; it is a party to the enforcement actions it brings.”59 Thus,
the FTC has conflicting interests. The common law works as a system
to develop rules over time because judges are impartial and must hear
any case brought before them.60 Litigants have financial incentives to
settle easy cases but devote time and resources into fighting harder
cases in order to determine what legal principles the court will
adopt.61 When the FTC brings its data-security actions, it is able to
choose which cases it wants to hear—a power it uses to further its own
interests as an enforcer of data security-standards.62 Further, busi-
nesses have strong financial and reputational incentives to quickly
settle with the FTC regardless of the merits of their cases. A business
that wishes to challenge an FTC proceeding must spend money on le-
gal fees, and it also must expect that news about its situation—includ-
ing news of any embarrassing data breaches—will appear in various
media outlets.63 Therefore, the FTC does not often hear alternative
points of view before issuing its orders.64 In short, critics describe how
the FTC brings actions in which it assumes the conclusion—the busi-
ness must have had insufficient data security—and uses its enforce-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 958, 1003. Even proponents of the FTC’s approach to data security concede
these twenty-year consent orders can be “overkill” in many—if not most—cases.
See Scope and Potential, supra note 34, at 2297.
58. Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 966.
59. Id. at 984. One other issue is that stare decisis does not bind agencies in the same
way as it does courts, meaning agencies generally can change their views at any
time. Id. at 987.
60. Id. at 983–84.
61. Id. at 982–83.
62. Id. at 984.
63. See, e.g., Gloss, supra note 52 (describing the FTC’s victory over Wyndham
Worldwide Corp.).
64. Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 985–86 (describing the FTC’s “unprecedented success
rate in its adjudications” and the incentives businesses have to settle).
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ment powers to develop the law in a direction it has unilaterally
deemed appropriate, ignoring other considerations and perspectives.65
IV. THE SEC’S APPROACH TO DATA SECURITY
In contrast to the FTC’s “regulate everybody” approach, the SEC
has kept its efforts comparatively focused. Section 501 of the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) gave the SEC an explicit mandate
to regulate data-security standards for investment intermediaries.66
The SEC used this grant of authority to promulgate the Safeguards
Rule, its main tool for developing and enforcing data-security stan-
dards.67 Beyond its regulations and enforcement actions, the SEC has
attempted to assist investment intermediaries in creating quality
data-security practices through nonpunitive measures, such as gui-
dance updates and voluntary surveys.68 The SEC’s data-security ef-
forts fall into two broad categories: (1) its guidance and enforcement
efforts regarding the Safeguards Rule and (2) its guidance regarding
other statutes and regulations.
A. The Safeguards Rule
The Safeguards Rule is the SEC’s clearest and most powerful data-
protection regulation. It imposes a requirement on investment in-
termediaries to “adopt written policies and procedures that address
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the protection
of customer records and information.”69 Investment intermediaries
must “reasonably” design these policies and procedures to protect cus-
tomer data; merely quoting the text of the Safeguards Rule verbatim
in an employee manual is insufficient.70
This section explains the SEC’s Safeguards Rule development in
two broad parts. First, it describes the SEC’s adoption of the Safe-
65. Id. at 986–87; see also id. at 980 (describing how the common law can lead to
development of good principles over time, but only where it results in a stable set
of principles without a predetermined outcome).
66. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102 § 501, 113 Stat. 1338
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012)).
67. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. 40,333
(June 29, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248).
68. See, e.g., OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, CYBERSECURITY
EXAMINATION SWEEP SUMMARY (2015) [hereinafter OCIE SWEEP SUMMARY],
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/cybersecurity-examination-sweep-sum-
mary.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/J2PD-UY4Q]; OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPEC-
TIONS & EXAMINATIONS, OBSERVATIONS FROM CYBERSECURITY EXAMINATIONS
(2017) [hereinafter OCIE 2017 UPDATE], https://www.sec.gov/files/observations-
from-cybersecurity-examinations.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/7EHZ-27V8]; CYBER-
SECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 248.30(a) (2017).
70. Id.; see J.P. Turner & Co., LLC, 98 SEC Docket 1729, 2010 WL 2000509, at *6–7
(ALJ May 19, 2010).
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guards Rule through its rulemaking procedures. Second, it examines
the eleven actions the SEC has brought using the Safeguards Rule.
Although the SEC has attempted to publicize some of its actions under
the Safeguards Rule,71 nobody has yet put together a comprehensive
overview of all the SEC’s actions. However, understanding the SEC’s
approach and some of the problems with it must begin with a review of
how the SEC has actually developed and used the Safeguards Rule
over time.
1. Development of the Safeguards Rule
The SEC promulgated Regulation S-P, including the Safeguards
Rule, in response to Congress’s statutory mandate in the GLBA.72
Regulation S-P focuses on three broad topics. First, it requires invest-
ment intermediaries to adopt policies and procedures to protect cus-
tomer data (i.e., the Safeguards Rule).73 Second, it generally requires
investment intermediaries to disclose their data-privacy policies and
practices to customers—both at the start of the customer relationship
and annually thereafter.74 Third, it establishes limits on when invest-
ment intermediaries can disclose their customers’ nonpublic personal
information to nonaffiliated third parties.75
Surprisingly, the original Regulation S-P proposing release had
very little to say regarding the Safeguards Rule.76 The SEC merely
explained that it was not prescribing specific policies or procedures to
adopt. Rather, the SEC “believe[d] it more appropriate for each insti-
tution to tailor its policies and procedures to its own systems of infor-
mation gathering and transfer and the needs of its customers.”77 The
adopting release also had very little to say about the Safeguards Rule,
only pointing out that commenters supported the regulation as pro-
posed.78 The only concern some commentators raised was whether re-
lated investment intermediaries in a fund complex could satisfy the
71. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Investment Adviser
with Failing to Adopt Proper Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures Prior to
Breach (Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter R.T. Jones Release], https://www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2015-202.html [https://perma.unl.edu/BE58-37TD].
72. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. at
40,334.
73. § 248.30(a).
74. 17 C.F.R. §§ 248.4–.5 (2017).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 248.10 (2017) (imposing requirements with which investment in-
termediaries must comply before they can transfer customer information); 17
C.F.R. § 248.7 (2017) (defining the form of the opt-out notice that investment in-
termediaries must provide customers before transferring personal data).
76. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg.
12,354, 12,365 (Mar. 8, 2000).
77. Id.
78. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg.
40,333, 40,357 (June 29, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248).
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rule by adopting a single set of policies and procedures.79 The SEC’s
response was that it believed intermediaries in a fund complex could
satisfy the regulation as proposed, provided their combined policies
were “appropriate for each institution to which they apply.”80
The original version of the Safeguards Rule differed from its cur-
rent form in one key respect: it did not require investment in-
termediaries to put their policies and procedures in writing.81 This
changed in 2004 when the SEC made its first—and only—amendment
to the Safeguards Rule. Section 216 of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2004 required the SEC (among other agencies) to
pass regulations regarding proper disposal of certain consumer re-
ports.82 While the SEC was promulgating its new disposal rule,83 it
also updated the original Safeguards Rule to require companies to
adopt written procedures.84 While one purpose for the change was to
encourage compliance (given the difficulty in protecting customer data
in a meaningful way without written policies and procedures), the pri-
mary motivation was to make the SEC’s oversight role easier.85
Checking to see whether written policies and procedures exist is eas-
ier to do than interviewing individual employees of an investment in-
termediary to see whether they follow any unwritten practices
regarding data security.86
A few aspects of the SEC’s Safeguards Rule are worth noting.
First, the SEC has been mindful of the costs that investment in-
termediaries will incur, keeping their needs in mind while developing
the Safeguards Rule.87 Second, the public was generally supportive of
the SEC’s proposed rule and amendments—the only real question
that arose during the rulemaking process was whether various insti-
tutions in a fund complex could have a uniform policy.88 Third, the
SEC’s approach has been very hands off, leaving investment in-
termediaries great freedom to design their policies around their own
specific needs. In fact, the SEC expressly refused to amend its Safe-
guards Rule to make it closer to the FTC’s version of the rule, which
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 40,371.
82. Disposal of Consumer Report Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,321 (Dec. 8, 2004)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 248.30).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 248.30(b) (2017).
84. Disposal of Consumer Report Information, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,325.
85. Id.
86. Cf. infra subsection VI.A.4. (prescribing a recordkeeping requirement as an
amendment to the Safeguards Rule).
87. See, e.g., Disposal of Consumer Report Information, 69 Fed. Reg. at 71,326.
88. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg.
40,333, 40,357 (June 29, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248).
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specified elements that regulated financial institutions must include
in their plans.89
2. Safeguards Rule Enforcement Actions
Although the SEC adopted the Safeguards Rule in 2000—later
clarifying it in 2004 to require written policies—it did not bring any
enforcement actions under it for almost eight years. Since then, it has
brought a total of eleven enforcement actions against various invest-
ment intermediaries and their employees.90 Only two of the decisions
have gone before an administrative law judge (ALJ); the rest quickly
settled.91 However, a few things stand out about these actions. First,
violations of the Safeguards Rule seem to be secondary considerations
in several of the decisions, with the primary violations being for will-
ing but unauthorized transfers of information to unaffiliated third
parties.92 Second, the decisions often do not explain why certain prac-
tices were unsafe, even where the only alleged violation was of the
Safeguards Rule and the penalty was substantial.93
a. NEXT Financial Group
In 2008, the SEC brought its first enforcement action involving the
Safeguards Rule.94 The defendant, NEXT Financial Group, was a bro-
ker-dealer that had an aggressive system in place for recruiting regis-
tered representatives.95 One of its requirements was that new
representatives provide it with information about all of their personal
89. 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (2017); Disposal of Consumer Report Information, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 71,325. The SEC did propose a regulation that would have set express stan-
dards for the Safeguards Rule. Part 248—Regulation S-P: Privacy of Consumer
Financial Information and Safeguarding Personal Information, 73 Fed. Reg.
13,691 (May 12, 2008). However, the SEC withdrew the proposed regulation in
2013. Since then, the SEC has not proposed any additional amendments to the
Safeguards Rule.
90. The Appendix of this Comment contains a table showing key details from each of
the SEC’s eleven enforcement actions. See infra Table 1.
91. J.P. Turner & Co., 98 SEC Docket 1729, 2010 WL 2000509 (ALJ May 19, 2010);
NEXT Fin. Grp., 93 SEC Docket 1369, 2008 WL 2444775 (ALJ June 18, 2008); see
Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 985–86 (describing the reasons companies quickly set-
tle in these types of agency actions).
92. See 17 C.F.R. § 248.10 (2017). Rule 10 applies when an investment intermediary
discloses a customer’s private information to a third party. Thus, the text of the
rule does not seem to apply to involuntary data breaches, nor has the SEC used it
in any case other than those in which the investment intermediary voluntarily
gave information to a third party without customer authorization.
93. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78021,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325 (June 8, 2016)
(reaching a one-million-dollar settlement for an alleged violation of the Safe-
guards Rule).
94. NEXT Fin., 93 SEC Docket 1369, 2008 WL 2444775.
95. See id. at *9–10.
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customers from their previous firms.96 NEXT did not determine
whether those customers consented to have the representatives trans-
fer the information to NEXT.97 Further, NEXT occasionally required
recruits to log into their current brokerage firms’ sites so it could col-
lect customer data.98 Once it had the data, NEXT would store it indef-
initely on the firm’s common server—a server accessible from outside
the office by employees with proper clearance.99 In addition to its
practices for incoming representatives, NEXT allowed any departing
representatives to take their personal customer files  without first ob-
taining customer approval.100
The SEC brought a claim against NEXT for multiple violations of
Regulation S-P. The main violation was the unauthorized transfers of
data without customer permission—both NEXT’s own transfers and
its requirement that incoming representatives bring data about their
old accounts.101 The ALJ agreed with the SEC that NEXT’s actions
were a straightforward violation of Rule 10 of Regulation S-P (regard-
ing unauthorized data transfers between unaffiliated parties).102
In addition to the Rule 10 violation, the SEC tacked on a Safe-
guards Rule violation, claiming that NEXT’s practices involving data
transfers left customer data vulnerable to unauthorized access.103 The
ALJ described the procedure for Safeguards Rule actions, saying that
the initial burden is on the defendant to show it adopted policies and
procedures regarding safeguarding customer information and kept
them up-to-date.104 If the defendant makes that showing, the burden
is on the SEC to establish “through competent evidence” that the poli-
cies were not reasonable.105 In NEXT’s case, the ALJ decided that
NEXT had not maintained appropriate policies—although it had pri-
vacy policies, NEXT did not amend them after adoption of Regulation
S-P to include information about customer data transfers.106 Thus,
the ALJ did not answer the question of whether NEXT’s practices ac-
tually put customer data at risk.107 Mostly for its violations of Rule
96. Id. at *10.
97. Id. at *11.
98. Id. at *11–12.
99. Id. at *12.
100. Id.
101. See id. at *32, *36–37. NEXT’s primary liability was for its own transfers of data.
Its secondary liability was for the incoming representatives’ transfers of data—
aiding and abetting other broker-dealers’ violations of Rule 10.
102. Id. at *32–33.
103. Id. at *33–34.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 33.
106. Id. at *13–14, 34.
107. The ALJ accepted the SEC’s argument that NEXT acted negligently in adopting
its early policies. Id. at *35. But the ALJ rejected the SEC’s claim that the Safe-
guards Rule required NEXT to encrypt its e-mail traffic, finding the SEC had not
462 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:446
10, but also partially for its violation of the Safeguards Rule, NEXT
had to pay a fine of $125,000.108
b. LPL Financial Corp.
A few months later, the SEC brought its second action involving
the Safeguards Rule.109 This action—against LPL Financial Corp.—
stands out for three reasons. First, it actually involved a data breach:
an outside attacker got access to LPL’s records and even attempted to
place unauthorized trades for customers. Second, LPL’s only alleged
violation was of the Safeguards Rule. Third, this was the SEC’s sec-
ond-biggest settlement under the Safeguards Rule ($275,000).110
LPL had Safeguards Rule policies and procedures in place. How-
ever, the SEC determined these policies were insufficient to protect
customer data. In particular, LPL had an online portal that its repre-
sentatives used to handle customer accounts and transactions. This
online portal had several security deficiencies: (1) it did not establish
minimum-strength requirements for passwords, (2) passwords would
not automatically expire after a set time, (3) users could not set their
own passwords, (4) it would not lock users out after numerous failed
login attempts, and (5) users had to manually log out because the por-
tal would only automatically log them off after eight hours of inactiv-
ity.111 Further, more than three hundred LPL employees had access
to a master user–password list for the online portal, including employ-
ees who likely did not need that information.112
LPL’s auditors discovered these security problems in mid-2006.113
They sent their findings to management, who began taking steps to fix
the issues (doing cost–benefit analyses of LPL’s options) in early- to
mid-2007.114 Unfortunately, before LPL fully addressed the issues, an
outside attacker accessed the online portal. The attacker obtained ac-
cess to at least ten thousand customers’ information and attempted to
place over $700,000 in unauthorized trades.115 LPL managed to block
most of the trades and even reimbursed customers for all lost funds
(nearly $100,000 worth).116 Importantly, the SEC’s main concerns
with LPL seemed not to be a lack of action but rather a lack of quick
given adequate advice on the matter that would have put NEXT on notice. Id. at
*35–36.
108. Id. at *49–50
109. LPL Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 58515, Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 2775, 2008 WL 4179915 (Sept. 11, 2008).
110. See id. at *6.
111. Id. at *3.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *4.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *2.
116. Id.
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action.117 In attempting to fix its security problems, LPL moved too
slowly to prevent the SEC from imposing a massive $275,000 penalty
as part of the settlement agreement.
c. J.P. Turner & Co. and Stephen Bauman
The SEC’s third and fourth actions were against J.P. Turner & Co.
and its acting chief compliance officer.118 The action against Stephen
Bauman was relatively straightforward: her job was to ensure J.P.
Turner was complying with all securities laws and regulations, mak-
ing her liable for aiding and abetting J.P. Turner’s failures.119 She
settled quickly. The only interesting thing about Bauman’s case is
that the SEC did not fine or censure her. Her only sanction was that
she had to desist from further violations of the Safeguards Rule.120
J.P. Turner, on the other hand, did not settle with the SEC. In fact,
it was the only case other than NEXT Financial to go before an ALJ.
The SEC first became aware of J.P. Turner’s Safeguards Rule failings
in late 2006. A J.P. Turner employee left several thousand sensitive
customer records, including social security numbers and bank account
information, in boxes on the street curb outside of his suburban At-
lanta home.121 A branch officer for the SEC’s Office of Compliance In-
spections and Examinations saw a report about the incident on the
local news, and the SEC began its investigation.122
The SEC discovered that J.P. Turner’s supervisory manuals did
not have any references to safeguarding customer data.123 When, in
2006, J.P. Turner finally adopted written policies in its manuals, those
policies consisted only of an almost-verbatim quote of the Safeguards
Rule.124 The policies specified that Bauman would be in charge of de-
veloping specific rules, but as far as the SEC could determine,
Bauman had not done so.125 J.P. Turner made a few policy statements
about data security available to customers, but those documents never
specified how J.P. Turner would protect customer data—only that it
purportedly understood the general importance of protecting data.126
117. See id. at *4 (“Nonetheless, LPL failed to take immediate corrective action.” (em-
phasis added)).
118. J.P. Turner & Co., LLC, 2009 WL 2138674 (July 17, 2009); Stephen Cheryl
Bauman, Exchange Act Release No. 60326, 2009 WL 2138437 (July 17, 2009).
119. See Bauman, Exchange Act Release No. 60326, 2009 WL 2138437.
120. Id. at *3.
121. J.P. Turner & Co., LLC, 98 SEC Docket 1729, 2010 WL 2000509, at *4 (ALJ May
19, 2010).
122. Id.
123. Id. at *5–6.
124. Id. at *6.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *14–15.
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In short, J.P. Turner did not fail to adopt reasonable policies; it
failed to adopt any policies. Notwithstanding this failure—and despite
the firm’s knowledge of the Safeguards Rule and Regulation S-P in
general—the ALJ refused to find that J.P. Turner’s employees acted
recklessly or deliberately in ignoring the written-policies-and-proce-
dures requirement.127 In particular, the ALJ pointed to the general
policy statements J.P. Turner had made available to customers, say-
ing these evidenced “attempts to comply with Regulation S-P and spe-
cifically, though less effectively, with the Safeguard[s] Rule.”128 Thus,
the ALJ declared that J.P. Turner had only committed a first-tier vio-
lation under the Exchange Act and imposed the maximum statutory
penalty of $65,000.129
d. Commonwealth Equity Services
Between its initial order in the J.P. Turner case and the ALJ’s ulti-
mate decision, the SEC brought its fifth Safeguards Rule action. The
defendant, Commonwealth Equity Services (CES), suffered a cyber at-
tack in November 2008.130 The attacker got access to information
from 368 accounts, including partial social security numbers (only the
last four digits), account types, cash balances, and owner net worth.131
The intruder attempted to place stock orders in eight of the accounts,
totaling more than $523,000 in unauthorized purchases.132 However,
CES caught the breach within minutes, ultimately cancelling the un-
authorized trades and absorbing $8,000 in losses.133 CES quickly noti-
fied the account owners, law enforcement groups, and the SEC.134
Like LPL Financial, CES had written policies and procedures in
place when it suffered a breach. However, the SEC found two
problems with the policies. First, CES did not mandate that employ-
ees have antivirus software.135 This fact was important because the
breached computer did not have any kind of antivirus program in-
stalled. Second, CES did not have policies requiring its IT department
to follow up with potential issues.136 The employee who suffered the
breach contacted the IT department several times in the months lead-
127. Id. at *17–18.
128. Id. at *18.
129. Id.; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21B, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (2012) (es-
tablishing the maximum penalties the SEC can assess for different violations—
17 C.F.R. § 201.1001 (2017) adjusts these amounts to account for inflation).
130. Commonwealth Equity Servs., LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 60733, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 2929, 2009 WL 3100577, at *2 (Sept. 29, 2009).
131. Id. at *2–3.
132. Id. at *3.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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ing up to the breach, complaining that his computer had a virus.137
But despite these calls, the IT department’s only recommendations
were that the employee (1) install antivirus software and (2) take his
computer to a local shop.138 LPL agreed to settle with the SEC, paying
a penalty of $100,000.139
e. GunnAllen Financial
Marc Ellis, Frederick Kraus, and David Levine were all employees
of GunnAllen Financial, Inc., a former broker-dealer.140 GunnAllen,
before ceasing operations, allegedly breached the Safeguards Rule and
Rule 10 (involving unauthorized data transfers) in four ways. First,
GunnAllen’s only policy regarding safeguarding information was in-
sufficient, merely reciting the Safeguards Rule text and providing ex-
amples of procedures the firm might adopt.141 Second, somebody stole
several of GunnAllen’s laptops, but nobody attempted to locate the
laptops or amend the firm’s safeguard policies in response to the
thefts.142 Third, as part of GunnAllen’s winding up, Kraus authorized
Levine to download sixteen thousand customer files to a flash drive
that Levine then took to his new employer.143 Fourth, GunnAllen’s
employees never updated its policies to cover protection of data during
its winding-up phase.144
Ellis was liable for the firm’s failures to adopt meaningful policies
or keep them updated before its winding up.145 He had been GunnAl-
len’s chief compliance officer, in charge of making sure the firm was
accomplishing its obligations under securities laws. The SEC indi-
cated that he should have directed the firm to amend its policies in
response to the laptop thefts.146 Thus, he was liable for aiding and
abetting GunnAllen’s Safeguards Rule violations. Unlike the other
two, Ellis did not face liability for violations of any other rules (such as
Rule 10), and he ultimately settled for $15,000.147
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *4.
140. Marc A. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64220, 2011 WL 1325566 (Apr. 7, 2011);
Frederick O. Kraus, Exchange Act Release No. 64221, 2011 WL 1325567 (Apr. 7,
2011); David C. Levine, Exchange Act Release No. 64222, 2011 WL 1325568 (Apr.
7, 2011). Because GunnAllen had wound up operations, the SEC chose only to
bring penalty actions against the three employees.
141. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64220, 2011 WL 1325566, at *2.
142. Id. at *3. Additionally, GunnAllen’s employees never attempted to contact the
customers whose data was on the laptops. Id.
143. Kraus, Exchange Act Release No. 64221, 2011 WL 1325567, at *1; Levine, Ex-
change Act Release No. 64222, 2011 WL 1325568, at *1.
144. Levine, Exchange Act Release No. 64222, 2011 WL 1325568, at *5.
145. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64220, 2011 WL 1325566, at *4.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Kraus, on the other hand, faced liability for violations of both the
Safeguards Rule and Rule 10.148 His Rule 10 liability resulted from
his granting Levine permission to take customer records to a new em-
ployer. The SEC’s discussion of how Kraus violated the Safeguards
Rule was limited, only saying that he “knowingly placed customer in-
formation at substantial risk of unauthorized access and misuse” by
allowing employees to take data.149 By allowing the transfers, accord-
ing to the SEC, he aided and abetted GunnAllen’s Safeguards Rule
violations.150 Kraus settled with the SEC for $20,000.151
Finally, Levine faced liability for violations of both the Safeguards
Rule and Rule 10. The Rule 10 violation was obvious enough: Levine
was the sales manager who downloaded the customer files to take to
his new employer. Additionally, the SEC’s theory for how Levine vio-
lated the Safeguards Rule was essentially the same as it had been for
Kraus.152 Levine’s sales manager position made him, according to the
SEC, a “senior officer” of GunnAllen.153 As a senior officer, he was
liable as an aider and abettor of GunnAllen’s alleged failures.154 Le-
vine settled with the SEC for $20,000.155
f. R.T. Jones Capital Equities Management
After its three actions in the GunnAllen case, the SEC did not
bring any further actions under the Safeguards Rule until 2015. At
that time, it brought a well-publicized case against R.T. Jones Capital
Equities Management, a registered investment adviser.156 R.T. Jones
was another case that developed in the aftermath of a data breach.
R.T. Jones had approximately eight thousand clients for whom it pro-
vided advice regarding retirement plans.157 In turn, each of these cli-
ents provided R.T. Jones with information about their individual plan
participants (more than 100,000 individuals).158 R.T. Jones stored
this information on its private servers.159
In mid-2013, R.T. Jones discovered that an outside attacker had
accessed its private server, potentially compromising all the data.160
148. Kraus, Exchange Act Release No. 64221, 2011 WL 1325567, at *4–5.
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See David C. Levine, Exchange Act Release No. 64222, 2011 WL 1325568, at *5
(Apr. 7, 2011).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See R.T. Jones Release, supra note 71.
157. R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No.
4204, 2015 WL 5560846, at *2 (Sept. 22, 2015).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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In response, R.T. Jones quickly hired several cybersecurity firms to
assess the damage. It also notified all of the potentially affected indi-
viduals.161 Despite their efforts, the cybersecurity firms could not ac-
curately assess the scope of the damage—the hackers had destroyed
the server’s log files, leaving no indications of how long they had ac-
cess to the data or what data they might have taken.162 The cyber-
security firms were able to discover, however, that all the attacks had
originated from IP addresses in mainland China.163
In response to the incident, the SEC launched an investigation of
R.T. Jones, ultimately discovering that R.T. Jones failed to have any
written policies in place for safeguarding customer data.164 The SEC
offered suggestions as to what R.T. Jones’s policies might have in-
cluded: “conducting periodic risk assessments, employing a firewall to
protect the web server containing client [information], encrypting cli-
ent [information] stored on that server, or establishing procedures for
responding to a cybersecurity incident.”165 Somewhat inconsistently,
the final sentence of the order suggests that R.T. Jones actually did
have policies in place: “Taken as a whole, R.T. Jones’s policies and
procedures for protecting customer records and information were not
reasonable to safeguard customer information.”166 But given that
most of the order talks about R.T. Jones not having policies, and it
never discusses specific policies R.T. Jones actually had, presumably
R.T. Jones’s failure was that it had no policies.167 Regardless, R.T.
Jones settled with the SEC for $75,000.168
g. Craig Scott Capital
The SEC’s next action came in 2016. Like several of its other deci-
sions,169 the primary violation in this case was not of the Safeguards
Rule. Rather, Craig Scott Capital, LLC’s (CSC) primary violation was
that it was not keeping certain records as required by the Exchange
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *3.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Alessandra Malito, SEC Nails Advisory Firm for Cybersecurity Failure Before
Data Breach, INVESTMENTNEWS (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.investmentnews
.com/article/20150922/FREE/150929966/sec-nails-advisory-firm-for-cybersecuri
ty-failure-before-data-breach [https://perma.unl.edu/HJ56-BLDN] (“The firm
never adopted written policies and procedures . . . .”).
168. R.T. Jones, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204, 2015 WL 5560846, at *4.
169. See, e.g., NEXT Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 SEC Docket 1369, 2008 WL 2444775 (ALJ
June 18, 2008).
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Act.170 CSC’s employees set up an eFax system that would automati-
cally convert all regular faxes into electronic files.171 The system
would then route those files to various e-mail addresses. However, a
few of the e-mail addresses CSC used were not firm addresses; they
were personal addresses of two employees.172
Over a four-year period, thousands of e-mails went through this
eFax system.173 While these faxes routinely contained private cus-
tomer data, CSC did not have a system in place for storing and main-
taining records of these communications when they went to the
nonfirm e-mails.174 Further, while CSC did have written policies as
required by the Safeguards Rule, none of the policies dealt with the
eFax system.175 Other deficiencies with the policies were that (1) they
did not designate an officer who would be in charge of compliance,
(2) they contained blank spaces (e.g., “[The Firm] has adopted proce-
dures to protect customer information, including the following: [meth-
ods]”), and (3) they did not require employees to encrypt data.176 CSC
ultimately settled with the SEC for $100,000.177
In addition to the firm itself, the SEC brought claims as part of the
same action against CSC’s two cofounders, who were also serving as
CSC’s chief compliance officer and chief operating officer at the
time.178 Despite the cofounders’ positions of power within CSC, the
SEC only found them liable for CSC’s failure to comply with the re-
cord-maintenance rules—neither was liable for the alleged Safe-
guards Rule violations.179 In its order, the SEC did not give any
reasons for why the two would not also have been liable as aiders and
abettors of the Safeguards Rule violations. The cofounders settled
with the SEC for $25,000 apiece.180
170. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (2012); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17a-4 (2017); Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77595,
2016 WL 1444441 (Apr. 12, 2016).
171. Craig Scott Capital, Exchange Act Release No. 77595, 2016 WL 1444441, at *2.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. *2–3.
175. Id. at *4.
176. Id. at *4–5.
177. Id. at *5.
178. Presumably, the chief compliance officer would have been in charge of ensuring
CSC was complying with all security laws and regulations. Thus, it is unclear
why the SEC was concerned that CSC’s safeguard policies did not specify a desig-
nated officer in charge of compliance. See id. at *4. Even more interesting is why
the chief compliance officer was not liable as an aider and abettor for CSC’s fail-
ure to comply with the Safeguards Rule. See id. at *4–5.
179. Id. at *5.
180. Id. at *6.
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h. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney
The SEC’s most recent Safeguards Rule proceeding was also its
largest. In 2016, the SEC brought an action against Morgan Stanley,
ultimately settling for one million dollars.181 A data breach was the
trigger for the SEC’s investigation against Morgan Stanley. Unlike all
the other Safeguards Rule cases, however, the outside attackers did
not steal the data directly from Morgan Stanley. Rather, they stole the
data from an employee who had in turn stolen the data from Morgan
Stanley.182
The employee’s job was to assist one of Morgan Stanley’s registered
financial advisors.183 As part of his position, he was supposed to have
access to only his financial advisor’s customer records through Morgan
Stanley’s firm intranet system. However, he discovered several flaws
in the system that allowed him to access all customer records, regard-
less of the managing advisor.184 Over the course of a year, he con-
ducted thousands of searches.185 He transferred the records he took to
his own personal server, purportedly so he could study market trends
and learn how advisors managed client funds.186 Even though he did
not intend to use the data in a harmful way, an outside attacker broke
into his server and stole the data.187
Morgan Stanley discovered the breach during a routine Internet
sweep, finding that the attacker had posted some of the data online
along with an offer to sell the rest.188 Morgan Stanley immediately
took steps to fix the problem. It began by identifying the individual
employee as the source of the breach. It then determined which
records he had taken and notified the potentially affected customers—
181. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325 (June 8, 2016). Interest-
ingly, the FTC also considered bringing an action against Morgan Stanley,
ultimately deciding to leave the matter alone. Letter from Maneesha Mithal, As-
soc. Dir., FTC Div. of Privacy & Identity Prot., to Lisa J. Sotto, Partner, Hunton
& Williams LLP (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/clos
ing_letters/nid/150810morganstanleycltr.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/R8VU-
JFWM]. While the FTC’s letter seems to indicate that Morgan Stanley handled
its data breach appropriately, it also points out that the letter “should not be
construed as a determination that a violation [of section 5] did not occur.” Id.
182. Morgan Stanley, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325, at *2.
183. Id. at *3. The employee later also became a financial advisor—before Morgan
Stanley discovered the data breach. Id. However, the distinction is unimportant
for purposes of the SEC settlement.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *4.
186. Id.; Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 2.
187. Morgan Stanley, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325, at *4.
188. Id.
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all 730,000 of them.189 It also took steps to remove the data from the
Internet, though the settlement order does not describe those efforts
in detail. Finally, Morgan Stanley notified law enforcement and other
authorities of the breach.190
The SEC brought an enforcement action against Morgan Stanley
for violations of the Safeguards Rule. Morgan Stanley certainly had
policies in place regarding safeguarding private customer information,
but the SEC found the policies did not meet the “reasonably designed”
standard of the Safeguards Rule in two aspects. First, although Mor-
gan Stanley did have policies and procedures in place designed to limit
employee access to records, its staff did not properly design the elec-
tronic systems that should have prevented the CSA’s actions.191 Sec-
ond, Morgan Stanley’s employees failed to conduct appropriate audits
on its intranet system—audits that presumably would have caught
the problem earlier.192 The settlement order does not specify whether
Morgan Stanley’s written policies required such testing.
In fact, the settlement order does not give clear examples of how
Morgan Stanley’s policies and procedures failed the reasonably de-
signed standard.193 The SEC’s only discussion of the actual Safe-
guards Rule takes place in three short paragraphs—an unfortunate
omission, considering the size of the settlement and Morgan Stanley’s
apparent good-faith attempts to protect customer data by adopting
written policies and procedures. The only reasoning the SEC gave for
its decision was:
Although [Morgan Stanley] had adopted written policies and procedures relat-
ing to the protection of customer [data], those policies and procedures were
not reasonably designed to safeguard its customers’ [data] as required by the
Safeguards Rule. For example, [Morgan Stanley’s] written policies and proce-
dures failed to adequately address certain key administrative, technical and
physical safeguards, such as: reasonably designed and operating authoriza-
tion modules for the [intranet] Portal[s] to restrict employee access to only the
confidential customer data as to which such employees had a legitimate busi-
ness need; auditing and/or testing of the effectiveness of such authorization
modules; and monitoring and analyzing of employee access to and use of the
Portals.194
B. Other Statutes and Regulations
Clearly, the SEC’s primary data-security tool is the Safeguards
Rule. However, the SEC has given guidance on other rules it might
189. See id. at *1, *4.
190. Id. at *4. The order never specifically says whether Morgan Stanley contacted the
SEC, saying only that Morgan Stanley notified “law enforcement and other au-
thorities.” Id.
191. Id. at *3.
192. Id.
193. See id. at *5.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
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use in proceedings against investment intermediaries who suffer data
breaches or otherwise fail to safeguard customer data. These rules di-
vide into two categories: (1) those rules that the SEC has merely
threatened to use and (2) those rules that the SEC has actually used.
In general, the rules the SEC has threatened to use would be applica-
ble in situations where the investment intermediary was a victim of a
data breach, whereas the rules it has actually used apply only in situ-
ations where the investment intermediary was actively doing some-
thing wrongful.
1. Statutes and Regulations the SEC Has Threatened to Use
The SEC’s primary guidance on data-breach liability is a guidance
update from 2015.195 In this guidance update, the SEC cited three
rules (in addition to the Safeguards Rule) that might impose liability
on investment intermediaries who suffer data breaches: (1) the Invest-
ment Company/Adviser Compliance Rules, (2) the Identity Theft Red
Flags Rules in Regulation S-P, and (3) rules pertaining to trade execu-
tions under the Investment Company Act.196 To date, the SEC has not
actually used any of these statutes or regulations in a Safeguards Rule
proceeding.
The Compliance Rules only apply to registered investment compa-
nies and investment advisers; they do not apply to registered broker-
dealers.197 These provisions are Rule 38a-1 under the Investment
Company Act and Rule 206(4)-7 under the Investment Advisers
Act.198 While the text of the two rules differs (Rule 38a-1 imposes
stricter standards), the rules generally impose the same three basic
requirements for investment companies and advisers: they must
(1) adopt policies and procedures to comply with all federal securities
laws, (2) perform annual reviews of their policies, and (3) designate
chief compliance officers who will be in charge of implementing the
policies.199 These requirements act essentially as a second version of
the Safeguards Rule—at least in the data-security context. An invest-
195. CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14.
196. Id. at 4–5. The SEC also hinted that data breaches might lead to insider trading
violations or other fraudulent activity. However, the limit of employer insider-
trading liability is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally John P. An-
derson, When Does Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading Make
Sense?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 24, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2017/01/24/when-does-corporate-criminal-liability-for-insider-trading-make-
sense/#_edn1 [https://perma.unl.edu/RRW7-8EKD]. Suffice it to say, investment
intermediaries probably would not be liable for insider trading done by outside
attackers. See CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 5 n.9 (describing lia-
bility for breaches “from insiders”); Anderson, supra.
197. See CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 4 n.7.
198. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.38a-1, 275.206(4)-7 (2017).
199. See §§ 270.38a-1, 275.206(4)-7.
472 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:446
ment company or adviser that fails to adopt policies under the Safe-
guards Rule would also presumably violate the Compliance Rules,
given that they require adoption of policies to comply with all securi-
ties laws (including the Safeguards Rule).
The Identity Theft Red Flags Rules came from a joint rule released
by the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.200 The
rule imposes two general requirements on all investment in-
termediaries. First, they must periodically determine whether they
have certain types of customer accounts.201 These customer accounts
include “any . . . account . . . for which there is a reasonably foresee-
able risk to customers . . . from identity theft.”202 Most types of cus-
tomer accounts likely fall under this broad definition (especially if the
investment intermediary maintains records of financial information,
social security numbers, etc.). Second, investment intermediaries that
maintain these covered customer accounts must establish a plan “de-
signed to detect, prevent, and mitigate” identity theft arising from
opening or maintaining such accounts.203 Just like the Compliance
Rules,204 the Identify Theft Red Flags Rules are effectively a second
version of the Safeguards Rule, requiring investment intermediaries
to monitor for and try to prevent breaches.
Finally, rules relating to the execution of trades under the Invest-
ment Company Act only apply to registered investment companies,
not to investment advisers or broker-dealers.205 These rules work to-
gether to govern redemptions of investment-company shares. For ex-
ample, if an investment company issues redeemable shares and the
holder of those shares requests a redemption, section 22(e) requires
the investment company to honor the redemption within seven
days.206 Rule 22c-1 requires the investment company to redeem the
shares at their value as it was calculated on the date of the redemp-
200. Identity Theft Red Flags Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,637 (Apr. 19, 2013) (codified in
scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.).
201. 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(c) (2017).
202. § 248.201(b)(3)(ii).
203. § 248.201(d). The text of the rule actually says the plan must be “designed to
detect, prevent, and mitigate identity theft in connection with the opening of a
covered account or any existing covered account”—note the lack of the word
“maintain.” Id. However, an investment intermediary could not “open” an “ex-
isting account,” so presumably the SEC intended for this rule to cover accounts
even after opening them.
204. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
205. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012) (“[n]o
registered investment company”); 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (2017) (“[n]o regis-
tered investment company”).
206. § 80a-22(e). A few exceptions to the seven-day requirement exist, such as for
times when the SEC determines an “emergency exists” that would prevent re-
demptions. § 80a-22(e)(2). However, the SEC has never promulgated rules defin-
ing when it would deem an emergency to exist. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2017); see
also infra subsection VI.B.3. (describing how the SEC can use its authority to
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tion request.207 A data breach might implicate both rules if it pre-
vented the investment company from calculating the daily share price
or otherwise redeeming the shares within seven days.208
2. Statutes and Regulations the SEC Has Actually Used
In its Safeguards Rule proceedings, the SEC has used a few rules
other than the Safeguards Rule itself. First, Rule 10 of Regulation S-P
forbids investment intermediaries from disclosing private client data
to unaffiliated third parties without obtaining customer authoriza-
tion.209 Second, section 17 of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-4 work
together to require broker-dealers to preserve certain records relating
to their business.210
Rule 10 is unlikely to apply in any situation in which an invest-
ment intermediary is only a passive victim of a data breach. The text
of the rule prohibits investment intermediaries from disclosing pri-
vate client information to third parties—a characterization that im-
plies the investment intermediary must take an action (either
transferring the data or permitting its transfer).211 The SEC’s adopt-
ing release for Regulation S-P also suggests that violations of Rule 10
require action on the part of the investment intermediary, describing
how the act after which it was modeled “prohibits a financial institu-
tion . . . from sharing nonpublic personal information.”212 In any case,
the SEC seems to have adopted this approach. In its four cases involv-
ing data breaches without any active transfers of data by the invest-
ment intermediary, the SEC did not use Rule 10.213
On the other hand, the recordkeeping requirements for broker-
dealers might pose a threat in a data-breach situation. In the context
of Safeguards Rule proceedings, the SEC has only used these rules
once. In its Craig Scott Capital decision, the SEC imposed a fine on
define when an emergency exists to protect innocent victims of breaches from
section 22 liability).
207. § 270.22c-1(a).
208. CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 5 n.11.
209. 17 C.F.R. § 248.10 (2017).
210. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-
4 (2017); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (2017) (establishing the actual records
broker-dealers must keep).
211. See § 248.10.
212. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg.
40,333, 40,351 (June 29, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248) (emphasis added).
213. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325 (June 8, 2016); R.T. Jones
Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204, 2015
WL 5560846 (Sept. 22, 2015); Commonwealth Equity Servs., LLP, Exchange Act
Release No. 60733, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2929, 2009 WL 3100577
(Sept. 29, 2009); LPL Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 58515, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2775, 2008 WL 4179915 (Sept. 11, 2008).
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the investment intermediary because its employees were actively try-
ing to avoid the recordkeeping requirements by sending records to
nonfirm e-mail addresses.214 However, a broker-dealer theoretically
could violate the recordkeeping requirements if it were to lose all of its
records in a data breach (e.g., a hacker deletes all of the records on a
broker’s server). Although the SEC has not used these requirements
like this in the past, it could do so in the future.215
V. REASONS TO REJECT THE STATUS QUO
In some ways, the SEC has done some things very differently than
the FTC. However, the reality is that the SEC’s approach and the
FTC’s approach are not as different as one might believe. The SEC has
taken the FTC’s general approach—using enforcement actions to de-
velop a quasi-common law regarding data-security best practices—but
on a much smaller scale. In a sense, the SEC has created a regulatory
scheme that everybody, both opponents and proponents of the FTC’s
approach, can find objectionable. Opponents of the FTC’s approach
would disagree with the SEC’s choice of strategy, while proponents
would disagree with how the SEC is executing its strategy.
A. Reasons Opponents of the FTC’s Approach Would Reject
the SEC’s Approach
Opponents of the FTC’s approach can find several things about the
SEC’s approach to like. First, Congress gave the SEC explicit author-
ity to regulate the data-security practices of investment in-
termediaries.216 Thus, the SEC’s actions have a legitimacy that the
FTC’s do not, considering the FTC’s general approach has been to
stretch its authority under section 5 to police the data security prac-
tices of every business in the country.217 Additionally, the SEC’s stat-
utory mandate is relatively narrow, giving it authority only to
regulate the data-security practices of investment intermediaries—
firms that realize they must comply with the SEC’s mandates and pay
attention to its releases.
214. Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77595, 2016 WL 1444441, at
*1 (Apr. 22, 2016).
215. However, the SEC did not raise the possibility in its 2015 cybersecurity guidance.
See CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14. Thus, whether the SEC would use
these recordkeeping rules in this manner is debatable. The answer might depend
on whether the broker-dealer was making an honest effort to protect the records
from outside attackers.
216. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102 § 501, 113 Stat. 1338
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012)).
217. Cf. Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 1005 (“The FTC’s [data security enforcement] ef-
forts would affect every business handling electronic consumer data in the coun-
try—effectively, that is, every business in the country. If ever there were a case
for expecting Congress to speak clearly, this would be it.”).
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However, these considerations do not change the fact that the SEC
is ultimately using the FTC’s basic approach to data security, and it is
causing several of the same problems the FTC is. One problem is that
some of the fairness concerns still apply—investment intermediaries
are not receiving fair notice of what actions might lead to massive
fines. For example, consider the LPL Financial decision.218 The SEC
assessed a $275,000 fine against LPL as part of its settlement agree-
ment because “LPL failed to take immediate corrective action” when it
discovered the vulnerabilities in its online system.219
But in a sense, LPL did take “immediate corrective action.” In fact,
it was handling the situation in a way that many, if not most, busi-
nesses would. After its internal audit team discovered the vulnerabili-
ties, they reported their findings to the chief information officer,
telling him that proposed fixes to the existing online system would
cost more than $500,000.220 The chief information officer then took
the findings to other members of LPL’s senior management, who in
turn presented it to the firm’s executive risk committee.221 Within one
month of the executive risk committee hearing about the findings, it
had formed “a separate committee to evaluate and implement secur-
ity” fixes for the systems.222 In short, LPL’s employees were handling
the situation like many businesses would handle a $500,000 prob-
lem—examining the pros and cons of various approaches and trying to
determine a solution that would fit their needs.
In fact, one notable government entity seemed to endorse the very
approach that LPL took: the SEC itself back when it first proposed the
Safeguards Rule.223 In that release, the SEC stated, “We have not pre-
scribed specific policies or procedures that financial institutions must
adopt. Rather, we believe it more appropriate for each institution to
tailor its policies and procedures to its own systems of information
gathering and transfer and the needs of its customers.”224 LPL’s risk
218. LPL Fin., Exchange Act Release No. 58515, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2775, 2008 WL 4179915, at *4.
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg.
12,354, 12,365 (Mar. 8, 2000).
224. Id. Additionally, it is worth noting that the SEC has reiterated its support for
letting investment intermediaries develop their own unique solutions to data se-
curity. CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 3 n.3 (giving suggestions for
addressing data-security issues but emphasizing that “[t]hese suggested mea-
sures are not intended to be comprehensive and other measures may be better
suited depending on the operations of a particular [investment intermediary]”
(emphasis added)); Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at
the SINET Innovation Summit (June 25, 2015) [hereinafter Aguilar Remarks],
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/threefold-cord-challenge-of-cyber-crime.html
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committee could have taken any number of approaches. It might have
decided to adopt the $500,000 proposed fixes, or it might have decided
to go in an entirely different direction, abandoning its then-current
online platform in favor of a new system. Further, even if LPL had
“immediately” rubber stamped the proposed fixes, it still might have
suffered the breach it did; nothing guarantees that proposed “fixes”
will solve anything (even when they cost more than $500,000). LPL’s
risk committee deserved a fair chance to consider multiple possible
solutions. In any case, LPL was handling things the way the SEC
seemingly wanted it to—considering its unique risks and business sit-
uation and trying to handle the problem in a practical manner.225 For
its trouble, it wound up paying the second-largest fine the SEC has
assessed in any of its Safeguards Rule actions.226
The LPL Financial decision raises an issue that is present in any
after-the-breach determination of whether a given policy or procedure
was reasonable: the risk of hindsight bias.227 “Tertiary hindsight” is a
problem in which a person who has learned the outcome of a situation
“faults others for failing to predict it.”228 This happens because people
who know the results of a situation tend to see those results as having
always been inevitable.229 While studies have sought to find a way to
reduce hindsight bias’s effects, the fact remains that data-breach vic-
tims in Safeguards Rule proceedings face a risk of prejudice.230 When
the SEC investigates an investment intermediary that has suffered a
data breach, the SEC knows that any policies or procedures the inter-
mediary had adopted ultimately proved to be inadequate at prevent-
ing the breach. However, that does not necessarily mean the
investment intermediary did not reasonably design its policies and
procedures; data breaches are almost inevitable, even for businesses
with outstanding data-security practices.231 Still, SEC investigators
are almost certain to give too much credence to the breach’s occur-
[https://perma.unl.edu/G552-R2MG] (describing how the SEC’s approach to
rulemaking recognizes that “entities must develop procedures that are tailored to
their unique risks”).
225. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. at
12,365.
226. See infra Table 1 (providing an overview of all the SEC’s Safeguards Rule actions,
organized by the size of the assessed penalty).
227. See Maggie Wittlin, Hindsight Evidence, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1359–62
(2016) (describing the problems associated with hindsight bias).
228. Id. at 1359–60.
229. Id. at 1359.
230. See id. at 1362–63 (describing the prejudice that hindsight bias causes in trials
generally and ways of trying to ameliorate the issue).
231. See supra Part II.
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rence when assessing whether the investment intermediary had im-
plemented adequate data-security practices.232
In a closely related problem, when the SEC brings an enforcement
action under the Safeguards Rule, it is acting as both a judge and a
prosecutor.233 While a judge in a court has incentives to thoughtfully
consider both sides of a case, the SEC has incentives to selectively
bring cases it can easily win so it can further its views on data secur-
ity.234 Given that investment intermediaries generally have not at-
tempted to contest the SEC’s actions,235 the SEC has been able to
shape the law of data security unilaterally based on its views of what
policies and procedures are “reasonable.”236 Further, the lack of ad-
versity from investment intermediaries has allowed the SEC to re-
lease numerous opinions that are overbroad and lack clear
explanation aside from the conclusion that the investment intermedi-
ary must have done something wrong.
Take for example the GunnAllen Financial settlement orders.237
Part of the SEC’s complaint against the three employees was that they
used a flash drive to transport customer data.238 As the SEC de-
scribed it, taking data on the flash drive put it “at substantial risk of
unauthorized access and misuse.”239 Ignoring the wrongful nature of
232. See Wittlin, supra note 227, at 1359–62. In a way, the hindsight-bias problem
might also explain why the SEC does not provide much reasoning in its decisions.
See generally infra notes 253–58 and accompanying text. In the SEC’s view, the
occurrence of a breach might make the investment intermediary’s alleged viola-
tions of the Safeguards Rule self-evident.
233. Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 984.
234. See id.
235. Only two actions have gone before an ALJ, and the defendant deserved to lose in
both situations. J.P. Turner’s failure was that it did not adopt any Safeguards
Rule policies or procedures. See supra subsection IV.A.2.c. NEXT Financial’s
main failures were its unauthorized disclosures of customer data; the Safeguards
Rule violation was not a major part of the order. See supra subsection IV.A.2.a.
236. See Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 984.
237. See supra subsection IV.A.2.e.
238. See Frederick O. Kraus, Exchange Act Release No. 64221, 2011 WL 1325567, at
*5 (Apr. 7, 2011).
239. Id. (emphasis added); see also David C. Levine, Exchange Act Release No. 64222,
2011 WL 1325568, at *5 (Apr. 7, 2011) (“[H]e placed customer information at risk
of unauthorized access and misuse when he knowingly downloaded [it] . . . to a
personal thumb drive that he physically took from the firm.”). Granted, part of
the SEC’s concern might have been the “personal” nature of the flash drive. Pre-
sumably, this means Levine actually owned the drive, rather than it belonging to
GunnAllen. However, the SEC never explains the distinction nor does it explain
why it believed a personal drive would create more risk than any other drive (if
that were in fact what it believed). A personal drive might have a virus on it that
the firm could not protect against, but that would be a reason for not using per-
sonal drives in any circumstances, not just when transferring data. Of course,
this is all speculation, given that the SEC never actually explained why it ex-
pressly used the word personal to describe the drive. In its orders, the SEC
seemed more concerned with the mere taking of the data—its use of the word
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the data transfer in the GunnAllen actions (the employees did not
have customer authorization to give the data to the new employer),
what principle should a reader take from the SEC’s order? Was the
SEC suggesting that flash drives are inappropriate and unsecure tools
for transferring data from one firm to another? If so, why? Is the risk
of a person misplacing a flash drive greater than the risk of an outside
attacker breaking into an online transfer system (such as e-mail)? If
flash drives are unacceptable, what tools should investment in-
termediaries use to transfer data?
Alternatively, the SEC’s decision might have had less to do with
the means of transporting the customer data and more with the
wrongfulness of the transfer itself. However, this view is unsatisfying
for a few reasons. First, the SEC already has a regulation to police
unauthorized transfers of private customer data—Rule 10 of Regula-
tion S-P.240 Second, it seems like a stretch to say that wrongfully tak-
ing data on a flash drive is any riskier than rightfully taking data on
the same drive. If the GunnAllen employees had gotten customer au-
thorization to take the data, would the SEC still feel the use of the
flash drive put the data “at substantial risk of unauthorized access
and misuse”?241 The SEC might have argued that a person who
wrongfully takes data is also the type of person who would be less
careful with it in general—but if the SEC was in fact taking that posi-
tion, it should have offered and explained it in the opinion.
Regardless, the orders are what they are—overbroad decisions
with very little explanation and unclear principles. Investment in-
termediaries attempting to comply with the Safeguards Rule ulti-
mately play a sort of reasonableness roulette, hoping that the SEC
will not second-guess their policies and procedures. In short, merely
doing what the FTC is doing—albeit doing less of it—is not a good
approach.
B. Reasons Proponents of the FTC’s Approach Would Reject
the SEC’s Approach
Proponents of the FTC’s approach to data security have one main
suggestion for the FTC: they think the FTC should expand its role by
bringing more actions against companies.242 Bearing in mind that the
personal seems designed to make the GunnAllen employees’ actions seem worse
than they arguably were. In any case, this uncertainty only bolsters the argu-
ment that the SEC should give better reasoning in its orders.
240. 17 C.F.R. § 248.10 (2017).
241. Kraus, Exchange Act Release No. 64222, 2011 WL 1325567, at *5.
242. See Security Law Professors Brief, supra note 50, at 2–3; Scope and Potential,
supra note 34, at 2266. Professors Hartzog and Solove also recommend the FTC
“seek milder punishments . . . for companies that have done most things right
and have made a good faith attempt at compliance.” Scope and Potential, supra
note 34, at 2297. Thus, they might also object to some of the SEC’s harsher pun-
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FTC has already brought dozens of data-security actions,243 these pro-
ponents of the FTC’s approach likely would be disappointed in the
SEC’s comparatively small number of actions and its lack of clear gui-
dance in the actions it has brought.
Certainly, investment intermediaries can distill some principles
from the SEC’s decisions, some of which are the same as the principles
that Professors Solove and Hartzog found with respect to FTC ac-
tions.244 For example, the Morgan Stanley action suggests that
“[f]ail[ing] to test the security of a . . . process” and “[f]ail[ing] to imple-
ment procedures to control access to information” are inadequate
practices.245 The Commonwealth Equity action indicates that
“[f]ail[ing] to implement cheap, easy-to-use, or common industry se-
curity practices,” such as installing antivirus software, is an inade-
quate practice.246 Several of the SEC’s decisions stand for the obvious
proposition that failing to adopt any policies or procedures is a viola-
tion of the Safeguards Rule.247
However, the problem with the SEC’s decisions, to the extent it is
trying to copy the FTC’s strategy of creating the “functional
equivalent of common law,” is that the SEC has not released enough of
them.248 Thus far, the SEC has released only eleven Safeguards Rule
decisions.249 Of those eleven, only three have happened since 2012.250
Part of the argument for why the FTC’s use of adjudications is appro-
priate is that “data security changes too quickly and is far too depen-
dent upon context to be reduced to a one-size-fits-all checklist.”251
Thus, if the SEC wants to use adjudication to shape the law of data
ishments, such as the one-million-dollar fine it imposed in the Morgan Stanley
decision.
243. See Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 957 (describing how the FTC had “brought over 50
enforcement actions” as of 2015).
244. See Common Law of Privacy, supra note 37, at 651–55.
245. Id. at 652–53; see Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No.
78021, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325, at *2–3
(June 8, 2016).
246. Common Law of Privacy, supra note 37, at 653; see Commonwealth Equity Servs.,
LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 60733, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2929, 2009 WL 3100577, at *4 (Sept. 29, 2009).
247. See, e.g., R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 4204, 2015 WL 5560846 (Sept. 22, 2015).
248. Cf. Common Law of Privacy, supra note 37, at 619 (describing the FTC’s actions
as being “in many respects the functional equivalent of common law”).
249. See supra subsection IV.A.2.
250. Morgan Stanley, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325; Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 77595, 2016 WL 1444441 (Apr. 12, 2016); R.T. Jones, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 4204, 2015 WL 5560846.
251. Scope and Potential, supra note 34, at 2259.
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security, it arguably needs to bring more actions and it needs to keep
its decisions current to match changes in technology.252
Beyond that, proponents of the FTC’s approach likely would want
the SEC to give better reasoning in its actions. Professors Solove and
Harzog describe in their article how “[t]hose [people] involved with
helping businesses comply with privacy law . . . parse and analyze the
FTC’s settlement agreements, reports, and activities as if they were
pronouncements by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve.”253 Assum-
ing readers parse the SEC’s data-security settlements in this manner,
they likely will not find the type of guidance they seek. Although the
SEC’s orders do reveal some general principles,254 they often do not
describe these principles in enough detail to help future investment
intermediaries with planning.255
For example, consider the Morgan Stanley action.256 The SEC, in
the course of assessing a one-million-dollar fine, spent only three
paragraphs describing the ways in which Morgan Stanley failed to
meet the Safeguards Rule’s requirements. Further, only one of those
three paragraphs arguably contained anything close to actual
reasoning:
Although [Morgan Stanley] had adopted written policies and procedures relat-
ing to the protection of customer [data], those policies and procedures were
not reasonably designed to safeguard its customers’ [data] as required by the
Safeguards Rule. For example, [Morgan Stanley’s] written policies and proce-
dures failed to adequately address certain key administrative, technical and
physical safeguards, such as: reasonably designed and operating authoriza-
tion modules for the [intranet] Portal[s] to restrict employee access to only the
confidential customer data as to which such employees had a legitimate busi-
ness need; auditing and/or testing of the effectiveness of such authorization
modules; and monitoring and analyzing of employee access to and use of the
Portals.257
Now imagine if, instead of merely providing its conclusions, the
SEC had given a fuller explanation of how Morgan Stanley’s policies
and procedures failed to satisfy its obligations under the Safeguards
Rule:
The Commission does not dispute that Morgan Stanley did in fact have
policies and procedures as required by the Safeguards Rule. However, despite
252. But see infra section VII.B. (arguing that the SEC should not use this approach).
253. Common Law of Privacy, supra note 37, at 585.
254. See supra notes 244–47 and accompanying text.
255. See supra section V.A.
256. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325 (June 8, 2016).
257. Id. at *5. The first of the three paragraphs only describes the general require-
ments found in the text of the Safeguards Rule. Id. The third paragraph says, “As
a result of the conduct described above, [Morgan Stanley] willfully violated [the
Safeguards Rule], which requires every broker-dealer and investment adviser
registered with the Commission to adopt written policies and procedures that are
reasonably designed to safeguard customer records and information.” Id.
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its efforts, Morgan Stanley did not reasonably design its policies and proce-
dures to protect private customer data. First, Morgan Stanley did not have
adequate policies and procedures for limiting employee access to sensitive
data. Firms today are more aware than ever of the threat that employees pose
to sensitive data. For a large firm, especially one with millions of customer
records and billions of dollars in annual revenue such as Morgan Stanley, pro-
tecting against employee mischief with numerous policies and procedures is
both obvious and imperative.
Second, Morgan Stanley’s policies and procedures failed to adequately ad-
dress its auditing processes for making sure that its internal systems did not
have security flaws. Although its internal technology department was con-
ducting periodic reviews, the procedures they were following should have
caught an issue posing as much risk as the one the employee exploited. The
employee’s unauthorized access took place over the course of an entire year.
During this time, Morgan Stanley’s technology staff apparently did not notice
a single red flag. Furthermore, the exploit itself was present in the system for
at least as long as the employee was using it. An internal auditing procedure
that misses such glaringly obvious security flaws is, simply put, not “reasona-
bly designed.”
Considering the obviousness of the flaws, the number of inadequate poli-
cies and procedures, the length of time over which the data thefts occurred,
the number of records put at risk, Morgan Stanley’s size and ability to imple-
ment quality policies and procedures, and Morgan Stanley’s knowledge of its
obligations under the Safeguards Rule, the Commission finds that Morgan
Stanley willfully violated the Safeguards Rule.258
In short, if the SEC is trying to adopt the FTC’s data-security
strategy, it is failing. Its few decisions do not give the clarity that
others have found in the FTC’s decisions,259 and it has not brought
enough actions to show investment intermediaries that it intends to
aggressively police the data-security realm.260
258. This model discussion is based on the reasoning the SEC seemed to get at in its
decision. The factual conclusions are debatable. Ideally, the explanation should
have been even longer and more detailed than this model discussion, describing
some of the policies and procedures Morgan Stanley had for limiting employee
access to sensitive data and conducting internal audits. Regrettably, neither the
SEC’s order nor any other publicly available documents describe what specific
policies and procedures Morgan Stanley had in place. In any event, an order writ-
ten like this would give readers clearer guidance on the issues they should con-
sider in developing their own policies and procedures.
259. Cf. Common Law of Privacy, supra note 37, at 651–55 (giving a list of the princi-
ples the authors found embodied in the FTC’s decisions).
260. See Security Law Professors Brief, supra note 50, at 9–12 (describing the results
of a survey indicating that companies take seriously the threat of FTC actions
because they know the FTC uses its ability to police data-security practices liber-
ally). See generally Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 48 (describing how the
“emergence of the FTC as a privacy regulator,” among other developments in the
market, has led companies to take data security more seriously than they have in
the past).
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VI. A THREE-PART PROPOSAL FOR ACHIEVING THE SEC’S
DATA-SECURITY GOALS
Although the SEC must reject its current approach, its broad au-
thority over investment intermediaries and their data-security prac-
tices gives it quite a bit of leeway to creatively solve its data-security
dilemma.261 The SEC’s ultimate goal is—as it always has been—to
encourage investment intermediaries to take data security seriously
while still affording them freedom to tailor solutions to their own
unique needs.262 The SEC can accomplish this goal by (1) amending
the Safeguards Rule, (2) amending some of its other rules, and (3)
adopting a new enforcement approach.
A. Amendments to the Safeguards Rule
The SEC should begin addressing data-security matters by amend-
ing the Safeguards Rule. Subsection VI.A.1. offers the new version of
the Safeguards Rule as the SEC should adopt it. Subsections VI.A.2.
through VI.A.6. describe the key changes the proposed rule would
make to the existing rule.
1. Text of the Proposed Regulation
(a) Requirement. Every investment intermediary must in good faith con-
sider and adopt written policies and procedures that address administra-
tive, technical, and physical safeguards for the protection of customer
records and information. When developing these policies, the investment
intermediary should seek to:
(1) Ensure the security and confidentiality of customer records and
information;
(2) Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or
integrity of customer records and information; and
(3) Protect against the unauthorized access to or use of customer records
or information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience
to any customer.
(b) Duty to Update. Every investment intermediary must adopt as part of
its written policies and procedures a plan, designed in good faith, for keep-
ing its adopted policies and procedures described in subsection (a) current
(including the plan described in this subsection).
(c) Recordkeeping. Every investment intermediary must keep records re-
garding how it has developed its written policies and procedures described
in subsections (a) and (b). These records must include:
261. See Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102 § 501(b), 113 Stat.
1338 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012)).
262. See generally Disposal of Consumer Report Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,321
(Dec. 8, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 248.30); Privacy of Consumer Financial In-
formation (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg. 40,333 (June 29, 2000) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 248).
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(1) In the case of a rejected policy or procedure, a brief description of the
considered policy or procedure and a detailed description of the reasons
for rejecting its adoption;
(2) In the case of an adopted policy or procedure (including amendments to
or revocations of existing policies or procedures):
(i) A brief description of the policy or procedure, both as proposed and
as adopted;
(ii) A detailed description of the reasons for accepting adoption of the
final policy or procedure, including explanations of any changes
from the policy or procedure as it was originally proposed; and
(iii) A description of the plan for implementing the policy or procedure;
and
(3) In the case of all considered policies and procedures, whether adopted
or rejected, a description of the process by which the decision to adopt
or reject was made. This description shall include, at a minimum:
(i) A description of any investigations into the costs and benefits of
the considered policy or procedure;
(ii) A description of any person or persons involved in the decision to
accept or reject the considered policy or procedure (including per-
sons whose involvement was limited to gathering and presenting
information to the ultimate decision makers); and
(iii) The time spent on any considered policy or procedure.
Every investment intermediary must keep these records for a period no
shorter than five years. In the case of a record relating to a currently
adopted policy or procedure, the investment intermediary must keep the
record for as long as the policy or procedure is in effect (including earlier
versions of current policies or procedures and any considered revocations
or amendments to current policies or procedures). An investment interme-
diary that fails to maintain these records will be in violation of this
section.
(d) Burden of Proof. In any civil action or case brought by the SEC under
this section, the investment intermediary shall have the burden of proving
it acted in good faith. In any criminal action for an alleged willful violation
of this section, the Department of Justice shall have the burden of proving
the investment intermediary did not act in good faith.
(e) Definitions. For purpose of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1) Adopt. The term “adopt” means to put the policy or procedure into
writing, implement it, and keep it current.
(2) Consider. The term “consider” means to examine a proposed policy or
procedure and, after assessing its advantages and disadvantages in
good faith, either accept and adopt it or reject it.
(3) Good Faith. The term “good faith” means a state of mind consisting of
honesty in belief or purpose and faithfulness to the goal of protecting
customer data and privacy.263
(4) Investment Intermediary. The term “investment intermediary”
means any broker, dealer, investment company, or investment adviser
as those terms are defined in 17 C.F.R. § 248.3.
263. See Good Faith, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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2. Good Faith Obligation
The most important change the proposed rule would make is that
it would replace the “reasonably designed” standard from the current
Safeguards Rule with a “good faith” standard. Scholars that have
written about data security and the FTC’s enforcement actions tend to
agree that a firm’s good faith efforts at providing data security should
be a factor in determining its potential liability.264 This new rule
would make that idea explicit, eliminating any after-the-fact determi-
nations about whether an investment intermediary’s policies and pro-
cedures were “reasonable” and instead shifting the focus to whether
the investment intermediary was making an honest attempt to de-
velop good policies and procedures.
Acting in good faith would be an absolute defense to any civil or
criminal liability the SEC or Department of Justice might try to im-
pose under the Safeguards Rule. For example, picture an investment
intermediary that declines to purchase antivirus software for its sys-
tems because it decides the Windows Defender software that comes
standard on every Microsoft operating system is sufficient. Although
the SEC might disagree with the substance of the investment inter-
mediary’s decision, as long as the investment intermediary could show
it reached that decision in good faith, considering the costs and bene-
fits of purchasing commercial antivirus software, the SEC could not
punish it under the Safeguards Rule.
Making this change would have several positive results. First, and
most importantly, it would promote the type of compliance the SEC
wants by clarifying the requirements investment intermediaries must
meet. Rather than placing the emphasis on developing policies that
the SEC will later find reasonable, the emphasis will shift to “encour-
aging firms to sit down, think about, and develop their policies.”265 As
the SEC has indicated numerous times in the past, the best data-se-
curity solution is one in which individual investment intermediaries
have incentives to develop policies tailored to their own unique risks
and situations.266 The proposed good faith requirement gives invest-
ment intermediaries that incentive by affording them the freedom to
consider and adopt policies and procedures without worrying about
the SEC second-guessing them.267
264. See, e.g., Scope and Potential, supra note 34, at 2297 (“One thing the FTC could
do is to seek milder punishments and shorter auditing periods for companies that
have done most things right and have made a good faith attempt at compliance.”);
cf. Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 1016 (proposing a system that would be similar to a
good faith defense in FTC proceedings: “encouraging firms to develop and disclose
data security policies” and then requiring them to live up to those policies).
265. Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 1016.
266. See supra note 224.
267. See Wittlin, supra note 227, at 1359–62 (describing the problems associated with
hindsight bias).
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Additionally, moving to a good faith standard will almost immedi-
ately solve most of the unfairness concerns raised by the SEC’s cur-
rent approach. One point bears repeating: data-security breaches are
nearly inevitable.268 Modern businesses and organizations face
threats from all directions, and they cannot possibly predict every at-
tack they will encounter. Even the federal government itself has been
the victim of numerous data breaches.269 In fact, one of the most infa-
mous data breaches involved a breach of one of the most secure gov-
ernment agencies: Edward Snowden’s theft of highly classified data
from the NSA.270 In other words, breaches happen. Thus, the fairest
possible regulatory scheme is one that examines not whether an in-
vestment intermediary suffered a breach but whether it made good
faith efforts in trying to prevent the breach.
Further, eliminating the “reasonably designed” standard in favor
of a good faith standard will actually make the SEC’s enforcement ef-
forts easier. It seems counterintuitive: the risk of a good faith stan-
dard is that an investment intermediary can throw poorly designed
policies together and later lie about the time and thought it put into
them. However, this risk is not as serious as it seems for a few rea-
sons. First, subsection (d) of the proposed rule places the burden in
civil actions on the investment intermediary to prove it acted in good
faith.271 This alleviates the SEC’s burden in these cases by preventing
it from having to prove what the investment intermediary’s employees
were thinking when they adopted (or rejected) a given policy or
procedure.
Second, the rule as proposed comes with a strict recordkeeping re-
quirement. Subsection VI.A.4. explains the details of this requirement
268. See supra Part II.
269. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5
Million People, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2015, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
07/10/us/office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html; Nir
Kshetri, Why the IRS Was Hacked Again and What the Feds Can Do About It,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2016-02-16/why-the-irs-was-hacked-again-and-what-the-feds-can-do-about-it
[https://perma.unl.edu/8S2R-38VB]; Darlene Storm, List of Hacked Government
Agencies Grows: State Department, White House, NOAA & USPS, COMPUTER-
WORLD (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2848779/list-of-
hacked-government-agencies-grows-state-department-white-house-noaa-and-
usps.html [https://perma.unl.edu/V8VU-44TS]. Moreover, the SEC itself recently
became the victim of a high-profile data breach. See Chris Isidore, Why the SEC
Hack Is a Really Big Deal, CNN MONEY (Sept. 21, 2017), money.cnn.com/2017/09/
21/news/sec-edgar-hack/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/N5ZL-9A7A]
270. Dustin Volz, How Did Snowden Steal Millions of Documents? He Had Help, DE-
FENSE ONE (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/02/
snowden-had-help/78830 [https://perma.unl.edu/6E22-V3GR].
271. Given the higher stakes and increased fairness concerns at issue in criminal ac-
tions, the proposed rule places the burden of proof on the Department of Justice
to disprove that the investment intermediary was acting in good faith.
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further, but the main point is that an investment intermediary must
keep records of all policies and procedures it considers.272 The invest-
ment intermediary also must describe, in detail, the reasons for ulti-
mately accepting or rejecting those considered policies or
procedures.273 Thus, SEC regulators will have an abundance of evi-
dence. They can examine the reasoning the investment intermediary
gives in its records, and they can even look at the number of policies or
procedures the investment intermediary has considered. If an invest-
ment intermediary has only ever considered a few policies or proce-
dures, the SEC can point to that fact as evidence the firm is not acting
in good faith.
One potential counterargument against the good faith standard is
that it merely replaces one uncertain standard with another. Deter-
mining whether a given policy or procedure is reasonable is a facts-
and-circumstances question, just like determining whether an invest-
ment intermediary is acting in good faith. However, the uncertainties
presented by the reasonableness and good faith standards are very
different. Some uncertainty is inevitable in the field of data secur-
ity.274 The proposed rule shifts that uncertainty from a highly techni-
cal area (determining the reasonableness of data-security policies and
procedures) to one that most people can understand, especially given
that the proposed rule defines good faith.275
Another possible counterargument is that the SEC should police
the substance of investment intermediaries’ data-security policies and
procedures because any data breach—even one against a firm acting
in good faith—hurts customers by exposing them to the risk of
theft.276 But when customers try to sue in the aftermath of data
breaches, they often lose because of difficulties in proving actual dam-
ages; the mere risk of future harm often is not enough, nor is emo-
272. Importantly, the SEC regulators themselves can make recommendations to in-
vestment intermediaries about policies and procedures they should consider. See
infra section VI.C.
273. See infra subsection VI.A.4.
274. Cf. Scope and Potential, supra note 34, at 2259 (“Yet data security changes too
quickly and is far too dependent upon context to be reduced to a one-size-fits-all
checklist.”); Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 998 (describing the difficulty in “formu-
lat[ing] specific rules ex ante” for “fast-moving areas, such as . . . data security”).
275. See infra subsection VI.A.5.
276. See generally ANN CAVOUKIAN, A DISCUSSION PAPER ON PRIVACY EXTERNALITIES,
SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION AND THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT 4–5
(2009), https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Resources/privacy_externali
ties.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/37DG-TJH8] (describing the negative externali-
ties, such as loss of privacy, that result from data breaches). The author of this
Comment wishes to thank Professor Gus Hurwitz of the University of Nebraska
College of Law for raising this counterargument during a discussion with the
author.
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tional harm that purportedly results from a breach.277 An
independent government agency such as the SEC can enforce data-
security standards where individual litigants cannot.278 Moving to the
good faith standard arguably would reduce the SEC’s ability to protect
customers from poorly designed policies and procedures.
However, the proposed Safeguards Rule actually does give the SEC
quite a bit of ability to regulate investment intermediaries’ policies
and procedures. As described further in section VI.C., SEC regulators
can recommend policies or procedures to investment intermediaries.
Investment intermediaries that do not consider these recommended
policies or procedures will not be acting in good faith and thus will be
liable under the Safeguards Rule. Importantly, the purpose of the
Safeguards Rule is not to allow the SEC to punish victims of data
breaches; it is to promote positive data-security practices and en-
courage firms to keep their customers’ data safe. As the SEC has
noted repeatedly, investment intermediaries are in the best position to
assess their own unique risks and develop their own defenses.279 The
proposed Safeguards Rule, along with a more vigorous enforcement
approach by the SEC,280 would promote this goal better than after-
the-breach prosecutions about reasonableness by empowering invest-
ment intermediaries to take creative approaches to data security
while giving the SEC a clearer mandate.281
3. Duty to Update
Subsection (b) of the proposed Safeguards Rule contains the only
policy/procedure that an investment intermediary must adopt: a plan
for keeping all of its Safeguards Rule policies and procedures current.
As others have noted, “Cybersecurity is not a problem to be solved, but
[is instead] a continuous threat that demands constant attention.”282
Thus, investment intermediaries must consider policies and proce-
dures designed to maintain their data-security policies and procedures
in light of changing technologies and threats.
277. Hooker & Pill, supra note 33, at 36–37; see also Danielle Citron, Some Good News
for Data Breach Victims, for a Change, FORBES (July 21, 2015), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2015/07/21/some-good-news-for-data-breach-vic-
tims-for-a-change/#4071ba69469a [https://perma.unl.edu/4PTU-972L] (describ-
ing the difficulty in recovering damages as a plaintiff in a data-breach lawsuit).
278. See generally CAVOUKIAN, supra note 276, at 11–13.
279. See, e.g., CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14; Aguilar Remarks, supra note
224.
280. See infra section VI.C.
281. If anything, this counterargument against the proposed Safeguards Rule might
be a good argument for making it easier for data-breach victims to show actual
damages in private lawsuits. However, that is a very different issue than whether
we should allow the SEC to impose punitive fines on investment intermediaries
based on an unpredictable and ever-changing “reasonably designed” standard.
282. Martin, supra note 21; accord Aguilar Remarks, supra note 224.
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As with all policies and procedures, investment intermediaries
must only design their updating plan in good faith according to their
own risks and situations. This approach allows the SEC to stay faith-
ful to its stated goal of allowing investment intermediaries to develop
their own policies and procedures.283 Alternative approaches, such as
requiring investment intermediaries to reconsider their policies and
procedures every couple of months or every time some triggering event
(e.g., a data breach) occurs, would be contrary to the SEC’s goals and
would risk incentivizing firms to focus on compliance rather than se-
curity. For example, if the SEC required investment intermediaries to
examine their policies and procedures once every three months, firms
likely would only check their policies every three months regardless of
whether they should check more often.284
4. Recordkeeping Requirement
As briefly described before,285 the proposed Safeguards Rule will
avoid some of the concerns in determining whether an investment in-
termediary has considered policies and procedures in good faith by im-
posing a strict recordkeeping requirement. Subsection (c) begins by
dictating the records investment intermediaries must keep. If an in-
vestment intermediary considers a policy but ultimately does not
adopt it, the firm must keep a brief description of the considered policy
and a detailed description of the reasons for rejecting it.
If the investment intermediary adopts a considered policy—includ-
ing amendments to or revocations of an existing policy—paragraph
(c)(2) requires it to include three main pieces of information in its
records. First, the records must briefly describe the policy or proce-
dure, both as it was originally proposed and as it was finally adopted.
Second, the records must describe in detail the reasons for adopting
the final version of the policy or procedure. Third, the records must
explain how the investment intermediary plans to implement the pol-
icy or procedure. Simply saying something like “our firm policy is to
restrict employee access to records” is not enough; the investment in-
termediary must give ways it will actually restrict access.
Additionally, investment intermediaries must include in all
records the processes by which they ultimately adopted or rejected the
considered policies and procedures. Paragraph (c)(3) establishes at
least three parts of this requirement, each of which will allow the SEC
283. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg.
12,354, 12,365 (Mar. 8, 2000) (“We have not prescribed specific policies or proce-
dures that financial institutions must adopt. Rather, we believe it is more appro-
priate for each institution to tailor its policies and procedures to its own systems
of information gathering and transfer and the needs of its customers.”).
284. See infra section VII.A. (describing the “checkbox compliance” problem).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 272–73.
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to determine whether the firm has acted in good faith. First, these
records must include any information gathering the investment inter-
mediary undertook when considering the proposed policies and proce-
dures. For example, if an investment intermediary had an employee
perform a cost–benefit analysis of a proposed policy, it would include a
description of that in the records. The proposed rule also incentivizes
investment intermediaries to perform these types of analyses for its
considered policies—the investment intermediary will include any
analyses in its records, which it in turn can use to demonstrate good
faith. Second, these records must include a description of all people
involved in making the decision to accept or reject a considered policy
or procedure. Third, these records must include a description of the
time the investment intermediary’s employees spent considering the
policy or procedure.
Finally, subsection (c) requires that investment intermediaries
keep all Safeguards Rule records for a minimum of five years. Five
years would strike a balance between the SEC’s interest in seeing
records and investment intermediaries’ interests in minimizing re-
cordkeeping costs. Seeing a five-year period of records will give the
SEC a good idea of whether an investment intermediary is acting in
good faith generally when considering its policies. However, an excep-
tion to the five-year rule is that an investment intermediary must
keep records relating to a policy or procedure it currently has in effect
for as long as the policy or procedure is in effect. Otherwise, the SEC
might not be able to examine the reasoning behind these policies and
procedures to see how they have evolved over time.
In addition to helping the SEC handle investigations of specific in-
vestment intermediaries, the recordkeeping requirement will have an-
other major benefit: it will provide the SEC with a vast amount of
information on how investment intermediaries are thinking about
data security. The SEC, as part of its data-security efforts, has shown
interest in understanding the policies and procedures that investment
intermediaries actually adopt. For example, in 2014 the SEC hosted a
roundtable in which SEC commissioners and staff met with industry
representatives, soliciting feedback about the SEC’s data-security ap-
proaches.286 Additionally, in 2015 the SEC’s Office of Compliance In-
spections and Examinations sent out a survey to more than one
hundred investment intermediaries, seeking feedback on their ap-
proaches to data security and their concerns with modern threats and
SEC regulations.287 The SEC uses this information to create its re-
286. Cybersecurity Roundtable, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/cybersecurity-roundtable.shtml [https://perma.unl.edu/9CNC-Q497]
(last modified May 11, 2016).
287. OCIE SWEEP SUMMARY, supra note 68. In 2017, the Office of Compliance Inspec-
tions and Examinations released findings from a follow-up data-security sweep.
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leases and provide guidance to investment intermediaries about data-
security practices.288 By establishing a recordkeeping requirement in
the Safeguards Rule, the SEC would gain access to all the information
it could want about how investment intermediaries handle their data-
security practices.289
The recordkeeping requirement might be subject to criticism be-
cause of the costs it imposes on investment intermediaries. It is true
that creating and maintaining records is not free. However, the pro-
posed Safeguards Rule would not cause any large or undue burdens.
The records themselves are hardly complex; investment in-
termediaries essentially must specify what they decided, how they
made those decisions, and why they made those decisions. Investment
intermediaries already must have policies and procedures under the
current version of the Safeguards Rule—the proposed rule just re-
quires them to create a minimal paper trail.290 Additionally, any bur-
den will lessen with time, as firms become more accustomed to
keeping the Safeguards Rule’s required records and develop standard
forms for doing so.
A second possible counterargument is that investment in-
termediaries could always forge files after the fact to make it seem as
though they were acting in good faith all along. But the risk of fraud is
not a reason to reject the proposed rule any more than it is a reason to
reject the current version of the Safeguards Rule. After all, an invest-
ment intermediary could always create records in response to notice of
an SEC investigation under the current system.291 Further, an invest-
ment intermediary cannot commit this type of fraud in response to a
OCIE 2017 UPDATE, supra note 68.  The OCIE included with its findings a brief
list of policies and procedures for investment intermediaries to consider. Id. at
4–5.
288. See, e.g., CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14.
289. See infra section VI.C. (describing how the SEC can use this information to pro-
vide guidance to investment intermediaries).
290. For example, if an investment intermediary considers and ultimately rejects a
policy, its record will only need to say something along the lines of:
We considered [policy] and ultimately rejected it because [detailed rea-
sons]. Our I.T. department analyzed the change; their findings are in-
cluded with this record (along with the names of the I.T. staff who
assisted in the analysis). Once they reached their conclusions, they sub-
mitted their findings to the chief compliance officer, [name]. He accepted
their reasoning and rejected the policy. This process lasted over the
course of one week.
291. If an investment intermediary maintains its Safeguards Rule records in elec-
tronic format, the SEC can analyze the files’ metadata to determine when the
firm made them, when it last edited them, etc. See generally Philip J. Favro, A
New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Obtaining Metadata, 13
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 (2007).  This might be an argument for requiring invest-
ment intermediaries to maintain their files electronically, rather than in physical
(paper) form.  However, that discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment,
given its conclusion that the risk of fraud is already minimal.
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suggested policy or procedure that comes directly from the SEC. If the
SEC, in the course of auditing an investment intermediary, suggests a
policy or procedure, it will not have to worry about when the firm con-
sidered the proposal; it will only care about the firm’s decision and
reasoning. In short, the specter of fraud is no greater under the pro-
posed rule than it is under any rule, including the current Safeguards
Rule.
5. Definitions
Subsection (e) of the proposed Safeguards Rule defines a few
terms. First, it clarifies that “adopting” a policy or procedure means
putting it into writing, implementing it, and keeping it current. Sec-
ond, subsection (e) defines “consider” as “examin[ing] a proposed pol-
icy or procedure and, after assessing its advantages and
disadvantages in good faith, either accept[ing] it or reject[ing] it.” This
helps elaborate on the process investment intermediaries must follow
when analyzing possible policies or procedures. Third, it defines “in-
vestment intermediary” to include every broker, dealer, investment
company, and investment adviser. This helps shorten the text of the
rule’s main requirements, thus making the rule clearer and more
concise.
Most importantly, paragraph (e)(3) defines “good faith” as “a state
of mind consisting of honesty in belief or purpose and faithfulness to
the goal of protecting customer data and privacy.”292 Courts have
struggled with defining good faith in many instances.293 However, af-
firmatively defining good faith in the rule itself will alleviate some of
this problem, giving courts a standard by which they can judge a de-
fendant’s conduct. Further, this definition applies perfectly to the goal
the SEC wants to achieve, which is to “encourag[e] firms to sit down,
think about, and develop their policies.”294 Of course, this definition
will still leave some uncertainty—determining whether a firm acted
292. This definition is based on the definition of “good faith” found in the tenth edition
of Black’s Law Dictionary. See Good Faith, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
293. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment
Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L.
REV. 398, 399–400 (2007) (describing the difficulties in defining the corporate
duty of good faith before the Supreme Court of Delaware reached its decision in
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)); Alan D.
Miller & Dr. Ronen Perry, Good Faith Performance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 689, 694
(2013) (describing good faith in the context of contract law, saying that “[d]espite
the general acceptance and apparent importance of good-faith performance in the
United States, courts and scholars have not been able to agree on the exact mean-
ing of this concept”).
294. Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 1016; see also CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note
14 (recognizing that investment intermediaries face unique risks based on their
specific situations).
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in good faith depends on facts and circumstances. However, a point
that bears repeating is that eliminating all uncertainty from data-se-
curity regulation is effectively impossible, given the complexity of the
topic and the rapid evolution of technology and threats.295 Rather, the
goal should be to shift uncertainty away from a highly technical and
constantly changing standard (the reasonableness of data-security
policies and procedures) to one that people can understand.
6. Removal of the Current Subsection (b)
The final change is that the proposed rule would remove the cur-
rent subsection (b) from the Safeguards Rule. The current subsection
(b) deals with disposal of consumer-report information, as required by
the Fair Credit Reporting Act.296 In short, this rule does not need to
be a part of the Safeguards Rule. This is not to say the SEC should
eliminate the disposal rule. Rather, it should move the rule to a new
section of the Code of Federal Regulations, possibly 17 C.F.R. § 248.31
(currently unused).
B. Application of the Safeguards Rule Amendments to Other
Statutes and Regulations
Amending the Safeguards Rule is not enough. As described in sec-
tion IV.B., the SEC has a number of regulations it can use in data-
security cases. Taking a good faith approach under the Safeguards
Rule would not accomplish its intended purpose if the SEC were able
to force investment intermediaries to adopt “reasonably designed” pol-
icies and procedures under other provisions.297 Fortunately, most of
the SEC’s other rules do not conflict with the proposed version of the
Safeguards Rule.
1. Investment-Company and Investment-Adviser Compliance
Rules
Both Rule 38a-1 under the Investment Company Act and Rule
206(4)-7 under the Investment Adviser Act require adoption and im-
plementation of “written policies and procedures reasonably designed
to prevent violation” of federal securities laws.298 Fortunately, neither
should create any problems for the proposed version of the Safeguards
Rule. The Safeguards Rule requires implementation of specific types
of policies and procedures—those designed to protect customer data.
295. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
296. 17 C.F.R. § 248.30(b) (2017).
297. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 248.201(d)(2) (2017) (requiring all investment intermediar-
ies to develop “reasonable policies and procedures to” prevent and catch identity
theft (emphasis added)).
298. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.38a-1, 275.206(4)-7 (2017).
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In contrast, the Compliance Rules require only that investment com-
panies and investment advisers adopt policies and procedures for com-
plying with other securities rules. Thus, adopting data-security
policies and procedures in good faith will satisfy these rules without
regards to the substance of those policies and procedures.
2. Identity Theft Red Flags Rules
The Identity Theft Red Flags Rules pose the greatest issue of the
SEC’s other regulations, given their explicit requirement that all in-
vestment intermediaries must adopt “reasonable policies and proce-
dures to” prevent and catch identity theft.299 Unlike the Compliance
Rules described in subsection VI.B.1., this requirement poses an issue
because, like the Safeguards Rule, it involves policies and procedures
specifically designed to handle data-security issues. While drafting a
new version of the Identify Theft Red Flags Rules is beyond the scope
of this Comment, the SEC must amend them in a similar way to the
proposed Safeguards Rule, replacing the reasonableness language
with a good faith standard.
3. Investment-Company Redemption Rules
The SEC does not need to change Rule 22c-1 under the Investment
Company Act, which only establishes the price at which investment
companies must honor redemption requests by shareholders.300 This
requirement does not have any inconsistencies with the proposed
Safeguards Rule. Additionally, section 22(e) does not conflict with the
Safeguards Rule, requiring only that investment companies generally
honor certain types of redemptions within seven days of the
request.301
However, the SEC could adopt one new regulation that could help
a data-breach victim avoid section 22(e) liability. If a data breach pre-
vents an investment company from honoring a redemption request
within seven days, the SEC has said that the investment company
“may be in violation of section 22(e).”302 However, section 22(e) also
says that the seven-day redemption requirement does not apply “for
any period during which an emergency exists.”303 Section 22(e) does
not define “emergency exists”; it gives the SEC authority to determine
via rule or regulation when it will deem an emergency to exist.304
Therefore, the SEC could adopt a regulation deeming an emergency to
299. § 248.201(d)(2).
300. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (2017).
301. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012).
302. CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 5 n.11.
303. § 80a-22(e)(2).
304. Id.; § 80a-22(e)(i). The SEC has never promulgated rules clarifying when it would
deem an emergency to exist. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2017).
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exist in any situation in which an investment intermediary has com-
plied with its obligations under the Safeguards Rule but has still suf-
fered a data breach preventing it from redeeming shares.
4. Rule 10 of Regulation S-P
The SEC does not need to make any changes to Rule 10 of Regula-
tion S-P, at least given the way the SEC is currently using it.305 The
SEC has never used Rule 10 against an investment intermediary that
was only a passive victim of a data breach. In fact, Rule 10 covers a
very different issue than the Safeguards Rule. While the Safeguards
Rule’s purpose is to make investment intermediaries think about their
data-security practices, Rule 10 is about preventing investment in-
termediaries from actively disclosing data to nonaffiliated third par-
ties without customer permission.306 Thus, the rules already should
not conflict.
5. Broker-Dealer Recordkeeping Rules
As described in subsection IV.B.2., broker-dealers must keep cer-
tain business records.307 Theoretically, a broker-dealer could violate
these requirements if it lost all of its records in a data breach. One
solution is to trust the SEC to use its prosecutorial discretion to not
punish victims of data breaches who made good faith efforts to protect
their systems. Thus far, this has not been a problem—the only time
the SEC used these recordkeeping rules in a Safeguards Rule proceed-
ing was because the investment intermediary was actively attempting
to avoid its recordkeeping obligations.308 Further, the proposed ver-
sion of the Safeguards Rule might handle any potential issues by en-
couraging investment intermediaries to consider policies and
procedures for backing up important records.
C. Enforcement of the New Safeguards Rule
Subsections VI.A.2. and VI.A.4. already described how the new
Safeguards Rule would actually make the SEC’s job easier by shifting
the burden of proof and giving it ample information via the record-
keeping requirement. In many ways, the SEC’s enforcement strategy
would not have to change. The main difference is that rather than
looking for investment intermediaries with unreasonable policies and
305. See 17 C.F.R. § 248.10 (2017); supra subsection IV.B.2.
306. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg.
40,333, 40,334 (June 29, 2000).
307. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 17a-
4 (2017).
308. See Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77595, 2016 WL
1444441, at *1 (Apr. 12, 2016).
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procedures, it would look for investment intermediaries seemingly not
complying with the Safeguards Rule in good faith. Additionally, the
SEC could take the opportunity under the new rule to be more aggres-
sive in its enforcement efforts.309 “Aggressive” in this context does not
mean the SEC would be trying to punish investment intermediaries
who seem to have complied in good faith; it only means that the SEC
would be vigilant in examining investment intermediaries’ records.
However, one additional part of the SEC’s enforcement authority
requires discussion: its ability to propose policies and procedures to
investment intermediaries. As the SEC investigates various invest-
ment intermediaries, it undoubtedly will find gaps in some firms’ poli-
cies and procedures. Not all of these gaps will, considered alone, be
evidence of bad faith. Investment intermediaries will inevitably over-
look some threats or possibilities, given how quickly technology
changes and the nearly limitless number of ways in which an attacker
can exploit a data-security system.310 When the SEC finds these pos-
sible issues, it can propose policies and procedures the investment in-
termediaries should consider.311 Doing so will put the burden on the
investment intermediary to actually consider the proposed policy or
procedure in good faith; a firm that fails to consider one of these pro-
posed policies or procedures would not be acting in good faith.
For example, if the SEC had investigated Morgan Stanley in the
months before the breach, it might have found the issues regarding
how Morgan Stanley was conducting its internal data-security au-
dits.312 These issues alone likely would not have shown that Morgan
Stanley was acting in bad faith. In fact, Morgan Stanley had policies
and procedures in place and, given its size and reputation, had almost
certainly considered them in good faith.313 Nevertheless, it overlooked
something, and that something ultimately led to the theft of
thousands of customer records.314 Had the SEC, in one of its routine
investigations, discovered the problems, it could have alerted Morgan
Stanley to the risks and prompted Morgan Stanley to consider various
possible fixes.
An investment intermediary could always reject an SEC propo-
sal—its only requirement would be considering the proposal in good
faith. Thus, the SEC could work closely with investment in-
309. See infra section VII.B.
310. See supra Part II.
311. The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations did this in its 2017 data-
security release. See OCIE 2017 UPDATE, supra note 68, at 4–5. The proposed
Safeguards Rule would take these suggestions and give them real power by re-
quiring investment intermediaries to consider them in good faith.
312. See Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78021, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325, at *5 (June 8, 2016).
313. See id.
314. Id. at *2.
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termediaries to build a system of public–private collaboration in devel-
oping and implementing quality data-security practices.315 The new
Safeguards Rule, when combined with the SEC’s enforcement author-
ity, would result in the best possible outcome for all interested parties.
Investment intermediaries would gain the certainty of knowing they
would not face punitive fines in after-the-breach adjudications regard-
ing the reasonableness of their policies, the SEC would gain the ability
to promote data security while collecting information about industry
practices, and customers would gain the safety that comes with better
data security.
VII. POSSIBILITIES THE SEC SHOULD REJECT
The three-part solution offered in Part VI of this Comment would
yield the best possible data-security outcomes. It would take the focus
away from after-the-fact determinations of whether a given policy or
procedure was reasonable, shifting it instead to encouraging invest-
ment intermediaries to pursue data-security solutions in an honest
and faithful manner. However, the SEC might consider other possible
solutions to its data-security dilemma. The SEC should reject other
possibilities that various academics have offered. None will help it
achieve its goal of letting market participants analyze and develop
their own policies and procedures while still enabling it to play a role
in shaping data-security practices.
A. Establish a Checklist of Specific Data-Security Standards
with Which Investment Intermediaries Must Comply
The first possible option the SEC might consider is adoption of
clear substantive requirements under the Safeguards Rule with which
investment intermediaries must comply. In other words, this possible
“solution” is to abandon the overwhelming consensus on data security
by encouraging firms to adopt checkbox-compliance mentalities.316
The problem with checkbox compliance is that it diverts a firm’s atten-
315. See Aguilar Remarks, supra note 224 (referring to statements by other govern-
ment leaders about the importance of collaboration between the public and pri-
vate sectors in data security issues); Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec.,
Remarks at RSA Conference 2015 (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2015/04/21/remarks-secretary-homeland-security-jeh-johnson-rsa-conference-
2015 [https://perma.unl.edu/3X92-NE25] (“Cybersecurity must be a partnership
between government and the private sector.”).
316. See, e.g., Scope and Potential, supra note 34, at 2259 (“Yet data security changes
too quickly and is far too dependent upon context to be reduced to a one-size-fits-
all checklist.”); Hurwitz, supra note 32, at 998 (describing the difficulty in “formu-
lat[ing] specific rules ex ante” for “fast-moving areas, such as . . . data security”);
Aguilar Remarks, supra note 224 (“[E]ntities must develop procedures that are
tailored to their unique risks.”); Basani, supra note 15 (“The ‘checkbox’ mentality
places too much emphasis on Compliance over Risk Management.”).
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tion away from creating data-security policies and procedures de-
signed to meet its unique needs, instead focusing on achieving
“wooden compliance with a checklist of practices that may reduce fu-
ture liability risk, but do not advance enterprise security.”317
The SEC, to its credit, has rejected this approach so far. Instead,
the SEC has allowed investment intermediaries to develop their own
solutions to data-security issues.318 Although the category “invest-
ment intermediaries” only includes four types of entities—brokers,
dealers, investment companies, and investment advisers—the princi-
ple of wanting unique solutions tailored to unique risks is the same.
Different investment intermediaries have different systems for han-
dling sensitive data. They interact with different software vendors,
keep different types of records, work with different types of clients,
have different net assets, etc. While they might be more similar in
their business situations than, say, a car dealership and a university,
their individual risks and needs are still unique. Trying to use a one-
size-fits-all approach would ignore these realities, putting the SEC in
the uncomfortable position of trying to create a rule that would some-
how satisfy the data-security requirements of every investment
intermediary.319
Further, even if the SEC could determine a perfect list of policies
and procedures for investment intermediaries that would ensure data
security, it would have trouble maintaining that list in a regulation.
Data-security issues evolve quickly—technologies change and new
threats arise constantly.320 In contrast, the administrative rulemak-
ing process does not move quickly, with new regulations and amend-
ments to existing regulations sometimes taking years to pass.321 This
problem likely would be even more apparent in the data-security area,
considering the difficulty in creating before-the-fact rules designed to
protect customer information.322 In sum, adopting specific require-
ments in a regulation would not help the SEC further its goal of en-
317. Archis A. Parasharami & Stephen Lilley, Wyndham, Heartbleed, and the Pitfalls
of Setting Cybersecurity Standards Through Litigation, DATA SEC. L. REP. (2014),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/News/97e0b26e-afbf-4522-85ab-4304a92d84
4d/Presentation/NewsAttachment/a75a9e2e-f126-4b39-a253-44788ef84463/Data
%20Protection%20Law%20Reporter%20(Pitfalls%20of%20Setting%20Cyberse
curity)%202014.pdf.
318. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), 65 Fed. Reg.
12,354, 12,365 (Mar. 8, 2000).
319. Cf. Aguilar Remarks, supra note 224 (“[E]ntities must develop procedures that
are tailored to their unique risks.”).
320. See supra Part II.
321. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “DeOssifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
322. See Scope and Potential, supra note 34, at 2259.
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couraging investment intermediaries to protect customer data; it
would actually undermine that objective.323
B. Aggressively Enforce the Safeguards Rule as It Currently
Exists
One reason that proponents of the FTC’s approach to data security
likely would object to the SEC’s approach is the infrequency with
which the SEC has brought its Safeguards Rule actions. Therefore,
the SEC might consider being more aggressive in its enforcement of
the current version of the Safeguards Rule. However, this approach
would do nothing to solve the fairness concerns that stem from its cur-
rent efforts.324
Additionally, adopting the proposed version of the Safeguards Rule
would actually do more to further the FTC proponents’ interests than
merely enforcing the existing rule more frequently. First of all, the
two options are not mutually exclusive; the SEC can adopt the new
version of the Safeguards Rule and aggressively enforce it.325 More
importantly, proponents of the FTC’s approach describe how its efforts
“spur[ ] companies to hire information privacy and security specialists
who then develop evolving best practices” in data security.326 How-
ever, that is exactly what the new version of the Safeguards Rule is
designed to do. Further, the proposed Safeguards Rule would do a bet-
ter job of helping the SEC determine best practices by requiring that
investment intermediaries keep detailed records of the policies and
procedures they consider. In short, the propositions offered in Part VI,
taken as a whole, would be a way of bridging the gap between oppo-
nents and proponents of what the FTC is doing, reducing the unfair-
ness in the SEC’s current approach while enabling it to strengthen its
data-security regulation efforts.
C. Cease Regulating Data-Security Practices
Businesses, including investment intermediaries, have many rea-
sons to take their data security seriously even in the absence of gov-
ernment regulation. Simply put, a data breach is an expensive event.
A recent study by the Ponemon Institute, a private research center
323. For the reasons explored in this section, adopting a safe-harbor regulation would
be equally ineffective at promoting good data-security policies and procedures.
But see Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law: Creating a Consistent and Incen-
tive-Based System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 412–14 (2016) (arguing that the FTC
should consider adopting a safe harbor).
324. See supra section V.A.
325. See supra section VI.C.
326. Security Law Professors Brief, supra note 50, at 2; see also Scope and Potential,
supra note 34 (arguing that the FTC’s efforts have led to better data security
practices in the market).
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that studies data security, found that a data breach can cause a com-
pany to lose millions of dollars.327 A company that suffers a breach
might have direct out-of-pocket costs, such as buying affected custom-
ers subscriptions to identity-theft monitoring services. But some of the
most important costs are those that result from harm to the victim-
company’s reputation (e.g., losing customers who no longer trust the
business to protect their data).328
Ignoring for a moment the fact that the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act
requires the SEC to regulate data-security standards,329 one might
conclude that market incentives already provide enough pressure for
investment intermediaries to take data security seriously. However,
while this is undoubtedly true in some cases, not every investment
intermediary will be a “good actor.” In fact, several of the SEC’s Safe-
guards Rule actions have come against investment intermediaries
that had no policies or procedures in place for safeguarding customer
data.330 In other words, market forces are not always sufficient to
drive companies to give careful thought to their data-security prac-
tices. Given the harm that can result from a data breach—both to the
company itself and to affected customers—the SEC is right to make
investment intermediaries consider their policies and procedures.331
The proposed Safeguards Rule strikes a balance, allowing the SEC to
continue its work in promoting data security while shielding invest-
ment intermediaries from punitive fines when those intermediaries
make good faith attempts to protect customer data.332
VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite this Comment’s criticisms regarding the SEC’s data-secur-
ity efforts, one point is worth remembering: the SEC has done a com-
327. PONEMON INST., 2016 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL ANALYSIS 2 (2016),
https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=SEL03094WWEN
[https://perma.unl.edu/M9ZV-VN43].
328. Id. at 3.
329. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102 § 501(b), 113 Stat. 1338
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012)) (“[E]ach agency or authority . . . shall
establish appropriate standards . . . .” (emphasis added)).
330. See, e.g., R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Re-
lease No. 4204, 2015 WL 5560846 (Sept. 22, 2015).
331. See PONEMON INST., supra note 327, at 2–3 (describing the costs incurred by busi-
nesses and customers in the wake of data breaches).
332. Compare Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78021,
Investment Advisers Release Act No. 4415, 2016 WL 3181325 (June 8, 2016) (the
investment intermediary arguably did not deserve its fine because it had adopted
Safeguards Rule policies and procedures and it was attempting to protect cus-
tomer data in good faith, as evidenced by its compliance with authorities in the
aftermath of the breach), with J.P. Turner & Co., LLC, 98 SEC Docket 1729, 2010
WL 2000509 (ALJ May 19, 2010) (the investment intermediary had no policies or
procedures in place and thus clearly deserved a fine).
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paratively good job handling the modern problem of consumer-data
protection. Unlike the FTC, the SEC has made a conscientious effort
to solicit public feedback and develop its authority through notice-and-
comment rulemaking. Further, it has been mindful of the costs regu-
lated investment intermediaries face. Rather than attempting to
strong-arm them into adopting expensive and potentially unnecessary
policies and procedures, the SEC has given them freedom to develop
individualized solutions tailored to their own unique situations.
Work remains, but the SEC is in a perfect situation to build upon
its successes while avoiding its past failures. By abandoning its cur-
rent enforcement approach and adopting the rules and policies recom-
mended in this Comment, the SEC can build the regulatory scheme
for data security by which all others would be judged. These changes
would not require much effort on the SEC’s part and they would actu-
ally make its enforcement role easier. With the right mindset, the
SEC can set the bar for public–private collaboration in the area of
data security, developing a system that encourages innovation, re-
sponsibility, and fairness.
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APPENDIX: SAFEGUARDS RULE PROCEEDINGS
The SEC has issued eleven orders involving violations of the Safe-
guards Rule. This appendix includes a table displaying an overview of
the SEC’s decision. Because subsection IV.A.2. of the text already de-
scribes the SEC’s decisions in chronological order, this chart organizes
them by penalty size. The decisions (organized chronologically, most
recent first) are:
1. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release
No. 78021, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, 2016
WL 3181325 (June 8, 2016);
2. Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77595,
2016 WL 1444441 (Apr. 12, 2016);
3. R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 4204, 2015 WL 5560846 (Sept. 22, 2015);
4. David C. Levine, Exchange Act Release No. 64222, 2011 WL
1325568 (Apr. 7, 2011);
5. Frederick O. Kraus, Exchange Act Release No. 64221, 2011
WL 1325567 (Apr. 7, 2011);
6. Marc A. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64220, 2011 WL
1325566 (Apr. 7, 2011);333
7. J.P. Turner & Co., LLC, 98 SEC Docket 1729, 2010 WL
2000509 (ALJ May 19, 2010);
8. Commonwealth Equity Servs., LLP, Exchange Act Release
No. 60733, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2929, 2009
WL 3100577 (Sept. 29, 2009);
9. Stephen Cheryl Bauman, Exchange Act Release No. 60326,
2009 WL 2138437 (July 17, 2009);
10. LPL Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 58515, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2775, 2008 WL 4179915 (Sept. 11,
2008);
11. NEXT Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 SEC Docket 1369, 2008 WL 2444775
(ALJ June 18, 2008).
333. David Levine, Frederick Kraus, and Marc Ellis were all part of GunnAllen Finan-
cial, Inc. GunnAllen had discontinued operations by the time the SEC issued the
orders in the three proceedings, so there is no separate GunnAllen decision.
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